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Synopsis
Having addressed the background, problem
definition, scope and approach to the research
. project which is documented in this dissertation,
an overview of the project and the results are
presented in this chapter.
Thi~ chapter documents the origins and reasons
for this research by examining potentially
non-secure computer environments a~d the
underlying problems. Thereafter the path context
model and its impact are reviewed. In addition
various examples are presented to illustrate the
underlying principles.
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1. BACKGROUND.
Traditional approaches to computer security have evolved along the
lines of the so-called secure systems theory [1]. During that period
software trends indicated that this type of approach could effectiv~ly
describe the security issues in any computer environment, denoted E.
The concept of an environment has been introduced to describe the
occurrence of a set of heterogeneous computer systems, together with
software, interconnected in such a way that it can logically be
considered as a single system.
Software capabilities have evolved significantly over the last two
decades to the extent that on-line real time and data basesystems have
become the norm. Thesedevelopments havegiven riseto architectures
and foUowedstrategieswhich create circumstanceswhich areclassified
as non-secure according to classical computer security theory.
Numerous vendors have actively adopted such directions to the extent
that the vast majority of commercial systems which make us'e of
software such as teleprocessing monitors and database management
,systems are potentially non-secure.
Most publications in dealing with computer security [3], [5], [6] and
[7] have extended classical theory in an attempt to accommodate
security in the environments -described above. Again the rapid
advancement of new technologies such asmicrocomputers, local area
networks (LANS) and their inter-connectivity surpassed the ability to
Page 2.
secure them. The untidiness of their software architectures and loose
structuring have created problems of their own. The last few years
have been characterised by the rapid deployment of the above
technologies with inter-connectivity further enhanced by wide area
networks (WANS) which often piggy-back on third party value added
networks (VANS).
The nature of these types of co-operative cum distributed processing
environments which utilise software architectures which in turn are
non-secure, have created a need to re-confirm a basic understanding
of the theory which underlies computer security. The mere fact that
the majority of commercially available computer environments are
potentially non-secure, yet with an increased need for security from a
business perspective, supports this.
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION.
To solve the computer security crisisa myriad of techniques have been
,developed, many providing an inappropriate degree of comfort to
those responsible for computer security. Assecurity packages evolved,
their implementation became synonymous with security albeit that
they contained inherent restrictions and were implemented on an ad
hoc basis.
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After details of a number of computer frauds were made public, the
demand for better computer security became a major issue.
Unfortunately the issue became clouded as some emotionalism and
sensation was promoted by numerous persons. The best evidence of
this is the number of articles in the popular press which deal ~ith
computer fraud.
A study [2] made in fulfilment of a masters degree examined the
interrelationships in internal control between manual activities, e.g.
division ofdutiesandcomputer related onessuchascomputersecurity.
The results led to the development of a model known as the Access
Model, details of which have been published [11]. The above study
concluded that more research of computer security fundamentals was'
required in view of the lack of published material in that area.
A summary of the major areas which were identified as constituting
the main reason for this project is presented as follows
(a) The inability of classical computer security to describe security
in modern heterogeneous computer environments effectively
and efficiently;
(b) The deployment of architectures and structures in software
which are potentially non-secure;
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(c) lack of published material which deals with the
interrelationship between an organisation's control
requirements and computer security; and
(d) The need to introduce a high degree of formalism in any area
being investigated. lack of formalism creates the risk of
propagating fragmented adhocracy.
3. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
The scientific challenge not always lies in describing what ought to be.
Often the greater need lies in providing solutions, sometimes
temporary, to the imperfect but real environment from which the
demands arise.
Within this context the scope of this research project was threefold
. C
To address computer security against the background of
potentially non-secure environments.
To introduce some degree of formalism based on classical
computer science thus providing a theoretical basis.
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To explore the potential of automated computer security
support for automated exposure evaluation, automated profile
generation and automated package evaluation.
It is by no means the intention to suggest that the results of this project
provides the only solution, nor that they cannot be enhanced or '
formalised even further. Instead it is intended to provide a sound basis
for addressing some of the computer security problem areas and to
introduce a conceptual foundation for either critique or enhancement
Without some bold venture into this difficult yet topical issue of
computer security in potentially non-secure environments nothing is
gained.
4. APPROACH TO THIS RESEARCH.
Based on the problem statement and scopeof this research, it isevident
that numerous approaches were possible :
(a) An empirical study of the occurrence of fraud and computer
security risks could have been done. The sensitivity of these
issues and some of the emotionalism attached created the risk
of an uninformed bias towards this research being introduced.
We therefore adopted a principle that anybody even vaguely
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familiar with computer,systems can confirm the issues which
have been raised. To havespent timeand effort in confirming
the obvious provided no added value and hence this avenue
was not further pursued.
(b) A very wide literature survey could have been carried out to
provide a detailed analysis of the problem, the use of various
techniques assolutions ora combination thereof. This research
resulted from twelve years experiencewith various aspects of
internal control including eights years specialisation in
computersecurity on an international level as well as a master's
dissertation [2J in this area. The danger of the literature route
approach lay in the risk of propagating the adhocracywhich is
evident in the current computer security arena. Instead we
-adopted an approach by examining organisational
requirements for computer security, the problems which are
introduced by modern technology and the theory which
underlies the topic by modelling each area and their
interrelationship. It is acknowledged that classified material
maybe present, but their lackof availability haveplaced them
outsidethe scope of this research project.
(c) Amore hollistic approachwherebythe basicissues ofcomputer
security could be formally examined providedanother avenue.
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Rather than elaborate analysis of detail this avenue provided
the opportunity of formally examining the broader issues and
their interrelationships. Whilst the risk of this approach lay in
it being ambitious and requiring fundamental work, the major
contribution was towards the scientificformulation and thi~king
thus giving rise to further scope for research.
Obviously any avenue adopted would have been subject to normal
research fundamentals.
After deliberation the hollisticapproach, item (c) above, was adopted
in view of the potential contribution that could be made. Essentially
this represents a fundamentalist approach best described as 'Back to
Basics", The danger of this type of research is that it could result in an
isoteric discussion which provided littleor no contribution. To address
this risk it was decided to document the research, and hence this
dissertation, as a number of independent chapters on which articles,
to be published internationally, could be based. Each article focuses
on a particular aspect as follows :
A. Chapter 2 entitled -"Overview of the Path Context Model"
contains a comprehensive overview of the research project. By
way of introduction it sketches issues such as dynamic initiation
of network sessions, multi-domain computer environments, use
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of multiple executions in single address spaces and
multi-domain system functionality which create potentially
non-secure environments. These same basic security
principles, to which any potential model should adhere, are
discussed. Following this, the model which forms the basis of
this research project, the Path Context Model (!'CM), is
introduced. Thismodel isbased on Random ContextGrammars
[8]. The proposed PCM formalises the concepts of accessor
transformation and baggaging as well as the following
components which provide the structure of a security system :
(a) ABaggage CollectionVehiclewhich creates the baggage
which consists of the information which needs to be
collected and transported across system boundaries in
order to achieve the objectives of computer security.
(b) A Security Profile which contains the security rules or
restrictions that need to be enforced.
(c) The Validator which matches the baggage and security
profile and provides the True or False condition for
allowing access to secured objects.
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A number of examples are introduced to illustrate the
application of PCM in providing security in potentially
non-secure environments.
B. Having (informally) introduced the PCM in chapter 2, chapter
3 discusses the model in much more detail, concentrating on
the formal language aspects, namely Random Context
Grammars, on which the PCM is based. Path Context
Grammars (PC grammars), and extended PCgrammars, derived
from Random ContextGrammars, are introduced.
C. Having established a model which is capable of addressing
aspects of potentially non-secure environments in Chapters 2
and 3, Chapter4 •Application ofthe Path ContextModel' deals
with theapplication ofthis modelincomplexcomputersystems.
Systems which exist in more than one domain, make use of
multiple system software components to access objects 'and
allow multiple executions ina single addressspace are covered
underthis heading. In additiona process forevaluating security
in terms of the established principles is presented which forms
the basis ofautomatedcomputersecuritysupport. This concept
which encompasses au.tomatic profile generation, automatic
risk evaluation and automatic package evaluation is aimed at
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introducing a framework whereby' the complexity of computer
security in the environments which have been described above
can be supported by automated tools. The way in which the
proposed PCM can be used to address these aspects, forms the
basis of this chapter.
D. As part of the research project on which this dissertation is
based, it was found necessary to apply a degree of formalism
to computer security fundamentals. The major reason for this
development was the lack of such formalism in published
material and it being a prerequisite for understanding
automated computer security support. Chapter 5 with the
heading "Computer Security Fundamentals" deals with these
aspects and describes a concept termed the Validity Hierarchy
which provides an interface between business principles,
computer security and the Path Context Model using regular
set theory and Random Context Grammar theory. .In terms of
structure this chapter contains an informaltreatmentof the topic
as well as an attempt to formalise the concepts. The
contribution of the PCM in addressing these fundamental
issues, is highlighted
E. Evaluation of the research.
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We can therefore summarise the thesis as follows, showing how the
peM forms the continuous thread right through the whole thesis.
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5
Introduction Formalisa- A~plication The PCM and
and tion of the o the PCM. Computer Se-
Overview of PCM. curity - Funda-
the PCM. mentals.
At the time of finalising this dissertation the following articles have
already been submitted.and/or accepted for publication:
ARTICLE SUBMITTED TO STATUS
A Path Context Model Elsevier for Accepted for
for Addressing Computer publication in publication.
Security in Potentially Computers and
Non-Secure Environments. Security.
Modelling Computer Elsevier for Pending.
Security in Potentially publication in
Non-Secure Systems Using Computers and
Formal Language Theory. Security.
Application of a Path IFIP/Sec '90 Pending,
Context Model for International
Addressing Computer Security ,
Security in Complex Conference.
Environments.
Application of a Path . Information Age Accepted for
Context Approach to Publication
Comluter Security
Fun amentals.
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Inherent in the approach adopted is a degree of redundancy and
duplication in the chapters to make each one separatelypublishable.
From a research methodology perspective the following phases were
identified and followed :
(a) Problem definition.
(b) Literature Survey.
(c) Model Synthesis and establishment of the underlying theory.
(d) Experimentation.
(e) Presentation.
Although the variouschapterscontain further details in relation to each
phase some comments on the Literature Survey were deemed
necessary.
..
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5. LITERATURE SURVEY.
Whilst there is a myriad of literature available which deals with
computer security, few applied to the objective of this research. As a
result the more well-known classical approaches and papers whic~
could assist with the synthesis of a theoretical model a-nd explain
principles were used. As the objective was not to research or review
specific techniques or methodologies few were found tobe relevant.
thus resulting in a relatively small bibliography.
It is acknowledged that there is a risk of a model, such as the Path
Context Model which is set out in this paper, may exist as classified,
confidential of unpublished material. To date, however, none were
discovered which required acknowledgement in this dissertation. On
this assumption this is therefore considered original work although a
relatively small bibliography has been presented.
6. RESEARCH FINDINGS.
The result of this project is a theoretical model which has been found
capable of addressing computer security in a significant number of
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situations. In fact, the more isotericand complex the environment that
needs to be modelled, the more effective the model has been found
to deal with it
As research this project has contributed to
(a) Formalisation of computer security fundamentals and insight
into problems areas.
(b) Potential for automated computer securitysupport in the form
of profile generation, exposure evaluation and package
evaluation.
(c) Application of Random Context Grammars as a basis for
handling a variety of computer security restrictions,
pre-requisites and/or conditions.
(d) Documenting the computer security concerns and principles.
(~) Applying classic computer science to real world problems and
illustrating the power of using theseapproaches.
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7. SUMMARY.
This dissertation documents the results of a research project which
deals with computer security in potentially non-secureenvironments.
It provides a fundamental approach to the requirements for bett~r
security in computer environments which do not comply with the
principles of classic security approaches. It is intended to introduce a
rejuvenationof computer securityresearch; the classic research having.
been done some time ago with relatively little publication of
subsequent work along with the rapid advances of computer
technology.
1.
2.
CHAPTER 2
OVERVIEW OF THE PATH
CONTEXT MODEL
Contents
SYNOPSIS
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE
PCM
Synoptic Perspective
Chapter 2
Introduction
and Overview
of the PCM.
Chapter 3
Formalisation
of the PCM.
Chapter 4
Application of
tJie PCM.
ChapterS
The PCM and
Computer Security
Fundamentals
OVERVIEW OF THE PATH CONTEXT MODEL
Synopsis
Having addressed the background, problem
definition, scope and approach to the research
project which is documented in this dissertation,
an overview of the project and the results are
presented in this chapter.
This ,chapter documents the origins and reasons
for this research by examining potentially'
non-secure computer environments an~ the
underlying problems. Thereafter the path context
model and its impact are reviewed. In addition
various examples are presented to illustrate the
underlying principles. _
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1. INTRODUCTION.
Every security system isdesigned to protectand control access to resources
of some real world computer system. Atany point in time it is intended
to projectsecurity policy enforcement by reflecting access capabilities of
subjects requesting access to objects in the system. The key question in
any environment that needs answering is who, implying granularity of
individuals, has access to what, implying granularity of discrete system
objects. The term granularity has been used to introducethe requirement
foridentifyingthe relationships between individuals and objects insufficient
detail that security can be effective. In its simplest form security constitutes
the control ofsimple and discrete subjects (e.g, Users) who requires access
to objects (e.g, Programs and files). The effectiveness or adequacy of the
securitysystem is thereforeits ability to differentiate at an appropriate level
ofgranularity betweenindividuals, orothersubjects, and anysystem objects
as well "as the integrity of the security system itself and the environment
within which itfunctions. Theclassical research in thisarea is represented
bythe Bell and LaPadula model whichoriginated from workdone atMITRE
[1]. The importance of this model lies in the degree of formalism which
was achieved byapplying classical computer science approaches.
As computers evolved and security became more complex, the simple
subject-objectmappingno longersatisfies the demandsofthe environment
As a result the Bell and LaPadula model became viewed as a theoretical
system which is unlikely to be implemented in commercial environments.
Enhanced models proposed [5], [3] are capable of describing security in
more sophisticated environments. The articles by Landwehr [6] and
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Summers [7] contain reviews of the various models should further
background reading be required. All the published models have a great
deal of commonality in the sense that they are based on discrete and fairly
simple relationships between subjects and objects. Theseapproachescan
take care of situations where primitive chaining takes place duringwhich,
say,.a user accesses a file for reading/writing by utilisation of one or, more
processes and programs. In addition the integrity of the security system is
enforcedbyasecurity kernel with secureand problem states which prevent
interference in a user's or system software's compartmentor addressspace
byother users and processes. This implies that implementation of such a
system is onlysuccessful ifa mechanism which restricts a user's processes
and activity to a single isolated address space, meaning single executions
in address spaces,. isa place. These are well-known operating and secure
systems conceptsas mostintegrity violations have resulted from the ability
to compromise these mechanisms.
Over the years most publications which have dealt with security have
focused on the application of the classical approaches whkh have been
mentioned above. Meanwhile developers of system and application
software have adopted different approaches to software architectures.
Some of these directions make the traditional approaches to security
difficult if not impossible to apply. Yet, ifanything the realities of relying
on vendor developedsoftware aswellas the increased demands for highly
reliable protection of computer resources are a fact of life.
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Traditional computersystems were largely single domain, restricted to one
host machine, as connectivity and the full use thereof has been a fairly
recentphenomena. Although computer research has propagated many of
these developments for over a decade it is only in the last few years that
we have seen integration, rapid deployment and extensive use of :
Wide area networks;
t
Local area networks;
Value added networks; and
Distributed processingwhere system data and/orapplication
functionality could be distributed.
The implementation of these technologies have resulted in new
phenomena in computer environments.
Dynamic rather than user initiation of network sessions.
Dynamic initiation and rerouting ofnetworksessions inother
domains of a multi-domain environment
Common usage of multiple executions in single address
spaces (MESAS) of operating systems where multiple users
share and execute processes, programs, etc. in one address
- Page 19.
space. This has even been extended to processes being
exchanged between software components which are
resident in different domains.
Multiple systemsoftware components are utilised in carrying
out simple on-line requests for processing or retrieving
information. One or more of these components may make
use of MESAS concepts.
Transparent multidomain access to data.
Transparent, multidomain application functionality.
Loss ofsingle useror individual identity during the processing
path, particularly where MESASconcepts are utilised.
Dynamic sharing of routines and processes among multiple
software components.
Parallelexecution ofprocesses in any of the above situations.
Presence of modules, programs and processes often nearing
10 6 in order of magnitude.
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The scope· of this chapter is to provide an overview of an alternative
approach for applying classical computer science approaches to the
situations listed above. It is therefore not our intention to analyse each
issueand its impact on security in this chapter. A more detailed discussion
can be found in chapter 5. On the other hand a conceptual understanding
of the security issues in computer environments described above are
necessary to appreciate some of the problem areas and an example is
presented in figure 1 for illustrative purposes.
Figure 1
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Fig. 1 sketches a fairlysimple set of accesses which are initiated at one end
by a user A 1 who retrieves information from files F 1 , F 2' F 3 in three
different domains without necessarily being aware or able to control any
of it. In a typical situation A 1would logon to system software components
S S 2 in domain 1 (D J whereafter the latter assumes control over all
subsequent processing. In fact, after A 1 has been identified to SS 2 in
domain 1 it isquite common to find that once the processes which execute
in the same address space as S S 2 assume control all subsequent activities
do not recognise A 1 nor even take cognisance of the person's existence.
In domain 3 (D ~ S S 3 gains access to the data with the A 1 granularity not
even accessible at all. In domain 3 there is often no system software
componentwhich even knows where the requests were initiated. Itrequires
little imagination to identify some of the concerns. Even if one were to
suggest cryptography.and sophisticated access control mechanism in an
attempt to control A 1 to a larger extent, it is clear that they have very little
impact;' perhaps only as a deterrent to unauthorised access. In addition
the vast number of models or processes, many of them called by others
disqualifies a view of discrete processes and simple 'subject-object
relationships in such an environment
The demands for a higher degree of security, the prevalence of such systems
today and the apparent lack of published material has given rise to the
research in which this chapter is based. The objective of this chapter is to
explore the development of a model which can be applied to computer
security in complex multi-domain computer environments.
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2. PRINCIPLES OF COMPUTER SECURITY
Amajor dangerwhen researching computersecurity isbecomingengrossed
with the myriad of techniques and emotional issues which are present
today. Much of the classical work and the principles have been ignored
bymore techniqueorientatedresearchers at the expenseof makingsecurity
a battleofwits. Invariable one finds that losing sight of the basicprinciples
results in the issues under consideration becoming blurred or distorted. It
is submitted that there are onlyfour basicprinciples that need to be borne
in mind:
Firstly security .is based on the construct of ultimately
restricting the capabilities of an individual who has access
to a computer system. It implies that the responsibility for
implementing, accessing or activating any process or task
ultimately vests with that person. Similarly chaining, proxy
login and even accesses across domains do not affect this
principle.
Secondly, having established the authorised user base and
restrictions there is a risk that a number of unauthorised
individuals will either attempt to access the system or,
alternatively, authorised users may attempt to act outside
the restrictions imposed on them. Asecuritysystem therefore
has two functions: to apply the restrictions and try to
preventand/or detect unauthorised activity.
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Security can be implemented in a preventative and/or
detective mode. Preventative mode is aimed at gathering
enough data about a user to decide whether the person is
authorised, or not, to be granted access to a protectedobject
or resource. Detective mode on the other hand, is directed
at collecting enough data about a userto decide, at.a point
intimeafterthe accessto the objector resource wasgranted,
whether the person was appropriately authorised to do so.
Both modeshaverelative advantages and disadvantages and
are recognised asthe main approachesto computersecurity.
Ultimately security must deal with reality. If reality means
dealing with computer environments which differ
significantly from the criteria which are specified by
traditional models then be itso. Thescientific challenge lies
in . developing alternatives whereby the security
requirementswhichare demanded byourenvironments can
be met.
3. APPROACH TO THE RESEARCH.
The research project on which this chapter is based originated from an
analysis or real world computer system architectures, increasing demands
for security and the difficulty ofusing traditional security models to describe
and implementsecurity. Infactreality hasnecessitated the need forsecurity
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mechanisms in environments which, in traditional terms, are potentially
non-secure. Atthe outset it is stressed thatwe are notsuggesting that other
security models are incorrect or invalid. In fact the Bell LaPadula model
is verysound. The problem lies in its application where the environment
under consideration is for exampleone such as described in fig. 1.
The criteria which were imposed on the project is that any alternative
approach should extend traditional foundations and be able to
accommodate themasspecial cases. Inaddition the principles ofcomputer
security as described in the previous section should not be compromised
in any way. Surprisingly enough it was possible to constructa relatively
simple model which, with some experimentation" was found to
accommodate a variety of situations. We refer to this model as a path
context model (PCM) of security, or simply the PCM.
4. PATH CONTEXT MODEL OF COMPUTER SECURIIY.
The Path Context Model (PCM) is based on two basicconcepts
Firstly, the concept ofan accesspathwhich isformed bythe various
components that need to beactivated or utilised inorderfora typical
user's requestto beexecuted. Itissubmitted thatthe initial originator
of any service request is always an individual termed a primary
accessor sayA i- Assume that Software Components S 1 , S 2' ••• S n
in a single domain D 1 are required to accesssome object, saya file
Page 25.
or a block of information on a file, 0 1. Then A 1 SIS 2 •••• S n 0 1 is
defined as an access path toO 1. The notation implies thatA linitiates
S 1 , S 1 in turn activates S 2 and so on.
Notes (i) n is finite for any environment.
(ii) There may be multiple access paths to 0 1• '
(iii) The total number of access paths in any
.
environment, E, is finite.
(iv) Any given S i is best described as a software
component major node which utilises or
activates hardware or other resources.
TypicallyS.consistofa setof tasks, processes,
routines or programs. It is submitted that
having the ability to control access via the
software is in line with software or firmware
based directions in computer engineering.
(v) The access path concept applies equally to
cross domain environment. In this case a
corresponding S i simply exists in another
domain.
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Secondly there are obvious advantages in having a security model
which accommodates preventative and detective modes even
though the lattermay onlyserveas a back-up mechanism. peM is
primarily gearedto prevention ofunauthorised accessbyattempting
to determine invalid access requests prior to allowing access to a
protected object. This is particularly importantwhere accessors are
transformed and domains crossed such as in figure 1. To achieve
this a principle of baggaging is introduced. Baggage is defined as
the minimum amount of information that has to be collected and
must accompany the access request or its route in order that
responsibility and access authority checking can be performed even
though various transformations or domain crossing may occur.
Baggaging has been found to be a useful concept when taking
cognisance of not only accessor transformations and domain
crossing, but alsointegrity parameters whichareassociated with S "
't = I •n.An example would be S i executing in superv~sor or
privilege versus problem state. By introducing baggaging this
research projecthasclarified someofthe traditionallycomplexareas
of computersecurity while leading to some interesting discoveries,
particularly concerning the role of many commercial techniques
and security packages. Thedetectionoption of PCM is quitesimply
a process of baggage retention and post access checking.
4.1. Notation
The following notation is presented to formulate peM in an environment
E:
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E={DXSXIXOXA}
D ={Valid domains}x K
S ={Valid software cornponentsjxx'
I ={Integrity states}xK
o ={Valid objects}x K
A ={Valid Accessorsjx.x, with @j)llways being an individual person or
primary Accessor
K ={Valid access classes}.
Fig. 2 illustrates the application of this notation in a complex environment:
Figure 2.
Element Example excluding Cartesian Products with K
D LAN, WAN, VAN
S Network software, teleprocessing monitor, DBMS.
I Problem state,supervisorstate,MESAS, Encrypted transmission
0 Program, file, block of data, data element
A User-transformed accessor .
K Read, execute, write, delete, passthru, pre-access checking,
post accesschecking
The concepts of an access path A I SIS 2 •••• S n Oland baggaging have
t
alreadybeen introduced. Toformalise the concept of baggaging a baggage
vector BV = (A, D, S, 1,0) is defined where BV reflects the values of
A •D , Sand 0 at different points in the access path. Where any value is
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unknown or cannot be determined it is assigned a nil valuedenoted 0. The
baggageBis definedas{BV l,BV 2 •••• • BV j}whereBV i oF BV i+l. Reasons
for not requiring a more elaborate definition will become evident later on.
4.2. Structure
After a number of avenues had been explored, the simplest and cleanest
approach for developing PCM was the utilisation of formal grammar
concepts. Obviously the other motivation isthe benefits provided byhaving
automata theory available for implementing such a model, particularly as
PCM could form the basis fora variety of systems, including expertsystems.
like anysecurity model PCM consists ofthree components. They havebeen
identified as the following distinct and mutually exclusive elements :
ASetofrestrictions which specify the security proceduresto be applied
termed the security profile.
A mechanism which collects information against which the security
profile can be applied termed the baggage collection vehicle.
A mechanism which performs the actual checking termed the
validator.
Using the notation in section 4.1. a formal grammar was developed to
accommodate this structure of the security model. Although it essentially
involves one grammar, separate definitions for the three components are
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presented. As the grammar is quite simple and only requires a basic
knowledge of formal grammar, we have not elaborated on the structure.
Instead a number of examples have been prepared to illustrate the
application of peM.
Specification of Baggage Collection Vehicle
A -7 A 1 I A 2 1A 3 1•••• I Ai; I C
D-7D 1ID2ID 31 IDmI0
S -7 S 1 1S21S31 1S n 10
1-71111 211 3 1··.. II pI0
0-7 °1 10210 3 1•••• 1Or 10
C -7 ADSIC
C-70
The extentof the baggage collection process is the mostsignificant element
in peM. Insofar as a computerenvironment's control blocks, logs or status
vectors are unable to provide information about the activities of primary
accessors, there is a securitydeficiency which constitutes a risk. For example
a baggage vector AID 1 SS 1 SS2A2SS301 would allow tracing of AI' s
activities to the point of accessing °I' Should BV assume a format of
SS2SS301 or SS301, no information about A 1 is known. No matter
what the capabilities of the security profile and validator are, it would be
impossible to apply appropriate security principles under these
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circumstances. Some of these situations are frequently solved with some
form of proxy principles [4]. Interestingly enough it was found that where
BV was deficient e.g. S S 3011 even proxy login constituted risk as it is
potentially possible for anybodyto access0 1 with no definite assignment of
responsibilities. This is, for example, aggravated by wild card proxies. It is
alsoshown later on thatO can beextended to anycombination ofA • D. S • I
ora.
Specification of Securit}' Profile
A ~ I A 1 I A 2 1 A31····1 At 10
D~IDIID2ID31.··.IDmI0
S~ISlIS2IS31 •••• ISnI0
I~IIIII21131••.• IIpI0
O~IOII021031····IOrI0
C~ ADSIC
C~O(B;F)
B~<C>
B~«C»
F~<C>
F~«C» ~
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This section deserves more of an explanation as it reflects the required
security restrictions in a given environment. Band F have been introduced
to reflect compulsory and prohibitive context respectively. B therefore
determines conditions which are compulsory to gain access to 0 while F
those which disqualify access to O. This can, for example, be used to
implement specific routes or integrity constraints. In addition the conditions
< C > and «c» have been introduced to reflect random and fixed
adjacency to accommodate compulsory productions. For example, access
can be restricted to a single domain and specific software or paths can be
specified in order ofaccess. Thusin enhancing overall securityand flexibility.
These concepts are relatively simple applications of random context
grammars [8].
The functionality of the security profile is to cater for possible restrictions to
enforce division of duties in an environment E. It is submitted that an issue
such as'confldentiality.ls a natural extension of division of duties. With a
random context grammar some very interesting restrictions are possible.
Although some case studies are presented below, we L point out that
conditions such as Al 0 1 ( « D 1 13 D 2 >> ;D 3) can be used to prohibit
access from LANS, say D 3 and enforce access via encrypted line, say I 3 ,
between domains D 1 and D 20 As the power of random context grammars
is available to PCM a variety of security restrictions can be represented.
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Validator.
The validator applies the risk profile conditions to the baggage reflected in
the Baggage Collection System and determines the validity of the access
requestto anysecuredobject Thestrength of thisapproach lies inthe focus
on the previous two componentsas the basis forsecurity whilethe validator
simply performs the "if...then" logic.
Rather than elaborate on the pure theoretical aspects of PCM, some short
case studies have been formulated to illustrate the underlying principles
further.
5. APPLICATION OF PCM.
Using Fig. 1 as the basis for illustrating various principles and applications
of PCM'are presented in this section.
Case 1.
Thefirst principle ofcomputersecurity isbased on the constructof restricting
the capabilities of an individual. Assuming F 2 is a secured object and that
the access is initiated by A 1 as ii1ustrated. In manycurrentsecurity systems
the baggage would only be available for D 2 and may be something like
A2D2SS1SS2SS3F2 or even simply D 2SS 2F 2 where A 2 is best
described as a transformed accessor which wasgenerated in to sign on into
D2' Under these circumstances of inadequate baggaging any security
checking isseverely restricted and there isnowayinwhichany responsibility
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can be assigned toA l' In fact, nosystem couldeven detect securityproblems
in D2- This problem manifests itself fairly frequently in multi domain
environments where network software, teleprocessing monitors and data
base management systems are present Taking this one step further one
finds that even though userauthenticationofA 1inD 1mayhave been carried
out bya verysophisticatedmechanism, itbecomes meaningless inD 2where
the actual secured object being accessed is located. Even having' an
encrypted line between D 1 and D 2 doesn't.solve the issueas we still cannot
determine anything about A i-
One may argue that reliance needs to be placed on the integrity of the
various environments. In the above example there is total ignorance about
the integrity ofD lor D 2; not particularly useful ifD 1and D 2are potentially
non-secure. Readers who are familiar with commercial environments may
recognisesome ofthese issues as they occurmore frequentlythan one wouId
perhaps like. Even though one would like to enforce an access restriction
Al F 2 across two domains, the absence of adequate baggage makes it
impossible to enforce.
By introducingthisextent of formalism into the various components, in this
"case the baggage collection vehicle, peM facilitates
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evaluating whether the baggaging in an environment E is such that
the activities of accessors and their responsibilities can be controlled
in the first place. Nosecurity profile or validator can compensate for
inadequate baggaging;
automatic evaluation of security risk by analysing baggaging
deficiencies in E;
given a specified security profile, PCM can be used to specify th~
baggage requirements to enforce it; and
evaluation of the true capabilities of a security system by evaluation
of the baggaging it uses or has access to.
Case 2 .
Assuming that we have more complete baggage through a 'comprehensive
baggage collection vehicle. The baggage for access to F 2 can, for example,
be representedbyAID 1 S S 1 lISS 2 I 2 S S 3 F 1 S S 3 S S 2 lISS 1 13 A 2 D 2
S S 1 lISS 2 I 2 S S 3 F 2 where I 1 could represent problem state execution,
1 2 could be MESAS and 1 3 encryption between D 1 and D 2' Providing this
degree of baggaging isavailable, Fig 3 contains some of the security profiles
which can be constructed in PCM :
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Fig. 3
Security Profile Meaning
A IF 2 A I has unrestricted access to F 2'
A 2 F 2~ A I has, say, read access to F 2 (F 2 r is actually a
different object in PCM to F~. On this basis
anything in Ecan be classified as a secured object
and protected.
A I F 2 ( D I ; D 3 ) A I can accessF 2 from D I but not from D ~ .
A 1F 2 C« D 1I3D 2 » ;D3 ) A I can accessF 2 provided it is done from D I via
encrypted line, sayI ~ to D 2- Noaccess from D ~
A I F 2 (1 1; I 2 ) A I can accessF 2 in problem state, sayI I, but not
where MESAS, say 1'21 present.
Norestrictions have been found which could not be accommodated by this
notation. This includes random or fixed ordering of any component in n
domains. Accessor transformation is simply accommodated in a -security
profile which states that F 2 is accessed by A 2 transformed from A I , e.g.
.
The above examples provide some illustration of the random context
grammar capabilities which are utilised by, in this case, the security profile
component, to provide :
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the ability to secure any resource in E and to allow nearly any type of
restriction;
introduction of a flexi-secure environment where certain objects can
be highly secured whilst others may remain unsecured;
accommodation of any environment even where LANS, WANS are"
present; and
research into the potential of automated profile generation and
maintenance.
Case 3.
The capabilities of the Validator are a function of the baggaging collection
vehicle' and the security profile. By implication the reverse is true in the
sense that security is limited by the baggage collection process and the
security profile that can be established. It is submitted that given any
environment E (see section 4.1.) which has a security system comprising a
baggage collection vehicle, security profile and validator it is possible to
'derive the actual security requirements as well as the limitations of the
security system in terms of either baggage collection, security profile
capabilities or both. The same principle applies where standard logging
facilities serves as the baggage collection vehicle.
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Proof:
Given any environmentE the number of access paths to its secured objects
is finite. The set of all access paths P is the determinant of the degree of
restrictionsR that need to be placed inE. Ptherefore determines the baggage
B = {BV 1 , BV 2 •• BV j} which is required to ensure thatR can be enforced.
As Band R serve as the specifications for a security system, we can write
them as B sand R so
Given any security system for E we decompose it into the actual baggag!ng
collection and security profile to give B a and R C%' Insofar as productions of
B sand R scannot be accommodated by B aand R a respectively the security
system cannot enforce the required degree of security in E. Should B a < B s
the baggage collection is inadequate or where R a < R s the security profiler
is inadequate. Assuming the validator functions in terms of B a and R awe
can determine where E is at risk for lack of adequate protection. PCM
provides a mechanism to compute the deficiency and riskwith a high degree
of formalism associated with it.
Case 4.
PCM can be used to model a classic secure environment such as those
described in the Bell and laPadula model [1] as a special case. Such an
environment is associated with one domain and two integrity states, say I 1
as problem and 1 2 as privileged state and provided that B = {BV 1 •• BV j}
Page 38.
incorporates II and 1 2 in its productions, e.g. A ~ Al S 1 110 1 or
A ~ Al S 1120 1 and its security profile, e.g. A ~ Al°1(/1; I 2) or
A ~ A 2 °1 (1 2 ; 0), the environment can be modelled. The relative
simplicity of these environments is evident from the above examples,
particularly the factthat baggage is not really a major issue due to its triviality.
Case 5 Accommodation of Specific Security Issues.
There are always a variety ofquestions when dealingwitha security model.
Quite often they reflect current security concerns and the intention of this
final case is to provide a briefsummary of some issues that can make PCM
a powerful model.
Issue Solution
Terminal security Extend D i to includea terminal identification and
protect as a secured object.
Passwords Not a mechanism which provides. security but a
technique to authenticate A 1 •••• An.
Public network As a domain, sayD i' with an integrity indicator I J
to reflect the risk issues.
Microcomputer As a separate domain with a device and integrity
c indicator associated with it
On-line transactions As a software S i associated with system software,
sayS i_ r
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6. SCOPE OF PCM.
While conducting a research on which this chapter is based, a number of
areaswere explored to research the scope of PCM. Of particular significance
was the relative simplicity with which the security issues in very complex
environments could be modelled and explored. Even environments.where
someareas required no restrictions whilstother needed to be highly secured
could be accommodated. This makes it possible to evaluate the
appropriateness and functionality ofsecurity software insuch environments
aswell as determinethe risk factors associated with it In fact, by using PCM
a total f1exi-secure set of restrictions can be defined, monitored or evaluated.
Even 0 can be extended to accommodate mostelements.of E.
Areas currently being explored includes the use of PCM as a basis for
automatic profile generation and maintenance. This can be achieved by
simply extending the accessor to include a security and/or job classification
without any loss of generality. In the event of the existing definition of
E = {D x S x I x 0 x A} no longer being able to describeit, it is a trivial
exercise to extend PCM by introducing another factor. Theoretically Ecan
therefore be infinitely extended. This kind of scenario may become
applicable to describesecurity in highly parallel environments or to unravel
access requests in fifth generation systems. Another natural extension may
be the introduction of fuzzy logic to include probabilistic factors.
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7. CONCLUSION.
Security requirements have become major issues in organisations as more
of the business activities have become computer supported. Enhanced by
strategic directions such as using information technology for competitive
advantage businesses now alsohave vastamountsof data available,.,usually
on-line. Unfortunately commercially available system software and
technological development such as micro computer, LANS, etc., have not
helped to alleviate security issues. In fact, the strategic directions adopted
by manyorganisations have actually aggravated the problem.
Based on experience with the organisational and technical aspects of
computer security, this research project was conducted in an attempt to
address the shortcomings of existing approaches, particularly in the light of
the computer environments being created. The approach adopted was to
revisit the basic.principles of computer security with the objective to
formulate a model which could accommodate the complexity of current
and futureenvironments.
The most significant contribution of this research project was the
-development and formalisation of the baggaging and access pathsconcepts.
These concepts allowed us -to overcome the restrictions of classical
approaches to computer security in modern and future computer
environments, many of which are potentially non-secure for a variety of
reasons. Application of the conceptsgaverise to thespecification ofa model
termeda Path ContextModel(PCM) to addresssecurity issues ina significant
numberofdifferent computerenvironments. Atfirsttheapproach appeared
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very simplistic, but was found .to accommodate an amazing number of
different environments. In fact the more complex the environment the
clearer the model becomes, mainly as a result of the baggaging and access
paths concepts.
The Path Context Model (PCM), an overview of which is contained in this
chapter, has enabled formal research in the areas of computer security in
potentially non-secure to an extent not yet found in published literature. It
is hoped that researchers will again revive computer security as an area of
research as it is likely to become a major area of concern in the future unless
formally addressed to accommodate new technology and system principles.
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Synopsis
At this stage the background to this project has
been covered (chapter 1) as well as an overview
thereof, including the origins, results and
implications (chapter 2).
The following chapt!!rs have been structured to
cover various topics which were presented in
ch,apter 2 in more detail. In this chapter the formal
theory of the path context model which was
presented in Chapter 2 is further developed and
formalised. Consequently the format of this
chapter is formal grammar oriented in the sense
that the application of Random Context Grammars,
as the basis of the path context model, is
presented.
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1. INTRODUCTION.
Most of the published material which deal with theoretical models of
computer security concentrate on relatively simple subject-object
security mechanismswhich exist in single domains computer resources
under the control of a single computer. Whilst very valuable work [1],
[3] and [5] have been published, their effective application in
distributed and co-operative pr.ocessing environments is often limited.
The main limitation is that modern computer environments are often
based on architectures which have traditionally been declared
non-secure. One example isthe phenomena whereby system facilities
allow multiple executions, initiated by more than one accessor, to take
place concurrently in one address space. Another is the transparent
or dynamic initiation ofsessions between two or more domains without
the ability to take cognisance of the origination or history of the service
request.
Rather than attempt to rehash existing secure system theory, which is
already well developed, the objective of this chapter is to present the
theoryand formalism ofa model which isaimed at addressing computer
.security in potentially non-secure environments. Potentially
non-secure systems are conveniently defined as typical Local area
networks (LANS), Wide area networks (WANS), Value added networks
(VANS) together with the computer systems and underlying system
software which have been linked and do notcomplywith the principles
of secure ~ystem theory.
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Thescope of thischapter isto present an alternative theoretical model
which utilises classic computer science theory and addresses the
problems inpotentially non-secureenvironments aswell as automated
security. The model, which has already been described in chapter 1,
is further formalised in thisone.
Probably the bestwayof introducingsomeofthe problems ofapplying
computer security definitions to a formal grammar based model is by
way of an example.. Fig. 1 represents a fairly conventional computer
system withthree primary accessors, always individual persons, issuing
requests to accessvarious elements of a file Fl.
Figure 1
.t:-1 -:2
I
I
I
I
I
I
:[ 1
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The constraints that need to be enforced are that A 1 and A 2 should
only access elements of F 1, say R 1. R 3and R 1. R s respectively, while
A 3 is permitted to control F 1 without gaining access to individual
elements. In a typical computer environment each primary accessor
could initiate various system software components, denoted S j for the
i" component, or application programs, denoted R Pi for the -i"
application program. To reflect the complete access process, the
concept of an access path which is formed by the various system
components that need to be activated to service a request is introduced.
For example AlSlS2RplS3FIRIR2 and A 3S 4S sF I are two
access paths in the environment with R 1 to R s representing data
elements which are contained in the fileF i- Obviously multiple access
paths do exist, the issue being that in any environment Ethe number
of access paths are finite. A short discussion of some typical security
problems are presented by reference to the above example
(a) The access paths which were used to illustrate its definition
show intuitively that simple object-subject relationships are no
longer an effective way of describing the security requirements
in environments such as in Fig. 1. The effectiveness of
object-subject relationships is further reduced by phenomena
in system software design which, firstly, transforms the primary
accessor, say A 11 to A 11 and A 12 for system software
componentsS land S 2which means that subsequent activities
are carried out under the accountability of a substitute or
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transformed accessor. It implies that a more accurate
description of an access path would. be
A I S I S2 A II R PI S 3AI2F 1 R I R 2withF 1 "thinking" itis being
accessed by A 12 usingS 30 The fact that A I is the individual
actually initiating the request is often unknown from S 2
onwards thus forcing reliance on system integrity or proxy
access. This is all very well in secure computer environments,
except that potentially unsecure environments, e.g.
multi-domain components with multiple executions in single
addressspace, may give rise to circumstances where significant
exposures arise.
Secondly, system software mayincorporate principles whereby,
say, S 3 controls access to all the elements inFl' S 3 demands
unrestricted or universal access to F I with no consideration to
. the restrictions that apply to A r-
Thirdly, applications can be developed insuchawaythataccess
to multiple application functions or computer resources are
allowed. For example program R P I could be used to access
R I ••• R 50 Unless the individual functions whichare imbedded
in R P I can be protected as objects, A I cannot be restricted to
R I and R 3 only. Definition of everything as both objects and
subjects with the underlying complex and multiple security
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interrelationships in any sizeable environment can only be
described as ad hoc and intuitive with significant closure and
accuracy risks in maintaining the underlying security system.
(b) Thesecurity implemented in the access paths used by A 1 and
A 2 in Fig. 1 is irrelevantwhenA 3 uses S 4and S sto esxess'F 1.
Perhaps A 3 needs to back-upF 1 and should not be permitted
togain access to the individual elementsR 1 • • • R sin Fl. Under
these circumstances yet another security strategy needs to be
devised.
(c) How is itactually determinedwhat AI ... A 3 can access and are
restrictions in the access paths necessary? Ad hoc approaches
or exhaustive interviewing seem very antiquated and risky in
relation to the technology being applied in complex
environments.
(d) The number of permutations that need to be thought through
in large systems make an intuitive "protect an- strategy
impracticable in mostenvironments.
Page 47.
2. NOTATION AND STRUCTURE.
The above has only been presented 10 illustrate the motive for
researching more formal frameworks which can accommodate the
issues in a more scientific manner. To provide solutions for the security
problems which are associated with non-secure systems, the Path
Context Model (peM) was derived. The notation and structure which
has been used is consistent with those developed in chapter 2. Using
that structure, the following propositions are motivated:
(a) It is obvious that an automaton can be constructed which
accommodates the baggage collection vehicle, security profile
and validator. Whether the exercise is initiated by multiple
machines, tapes or heads, classic computer science holds to
the extent that they can be reduced to one automata such as
aTuring Machine.
(b) The function of the validator is to examine a baggage vector
and to apply the restrictions contained in the security profile in
order to generate a condition which grants or rejects access to
an object Consequently there should be commonality
between the descriptions of the baggage collection vehicle and
security profile thus suggesting that only one grammar needs to
by synthesised and presented. It is therefore not necessary to
deal with each component of the security system separately.
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(c) It could be argued that classic secure system theory should
apply to computer security in general and that an attempt to
secure potentially non-secure environments is invalid. It is
submitted that reality dictates otherwise and that potentially
non-secure phenomena will be present in the foreseeable
future. Another paradigm whereby secure computer
environments represent a special case of a more general
computer security philosophy is therefore necessary. In this
respect the following additional points are made :
(i) Secure computer environments in the traditional sense
represents a special case of potentially· non-secure
environments as defined in this chapter.
(ii) In potentially non-secureenvironments additional information
.and tracking, the content of which can be derived from first
principles, is necessary to managecomputer security.
(iii) As a result of the risks in potentially non-secure environments
simple issues such as passing of access rights, establishing
security classes and simple subject-object relationshipscannot
fully describe and provide the degree of computer security
which is normally acquired.
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(iv) . Many commercial systems and vendor system software follow
the potentially non-secure route. This isevident from the small
numberof claims about environments which are secure in the
classical sense. Theapplication of the theory contained in this
chapter therefore lies in a wider and more complex area.
(v) Theoretically an object can be any component and can
therefore be located anywhere in E. It is submitted that any
service request is ultimately the responsibility of a person or
primary accessor A 1 although accessor transformations may
takeplaceamongdomains or other components. Forpurposes
of this chapter, however, it is appropriate to consider a set A
of accessors. To access an object in E, anyA 1would make use
of various components of E. The combination of A , D, S, 1
and 0 for a given service request is defined as an access path
in E thus creatinga setof access paths Mwhich consist of the
various components in E. It is also possible to define for any
M i E M a set of conditions or restrictions in terms-ofany of its
components or combination thereofwhich needto beenforced
for access to be granted to a pre-defined object 0 i'
Another way of defining restrictions is by creating a concept of
permittingandforbidding conditions. Theformerdictates underwhich
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circumstances access too jean be obtained whereasthe latter prohibits
access in the event of certain circumstances being present .The
following examples illustrate this concept :
(a) An object 0 i may be accessed via MI' M 2. M 3 (permitting
condition) but not via M 4. M 5 (forbidding conditions).
(b) Object 0 1 may only be accessed via domain D j (permitting
condition) but not if SIS 2 I 1 forms part of any access path
(forbidding condition).
(c) Object 0 1 may only be accessed if the request was initiated
from domain D 2 with the specific request if liE I in E
represented an encrypted transmission (permitting condition)
but not if this request was in the clear (forbidding condition).
It therefore appears that the mechanism of permitting and forbidding
context conditions ean be used very constructively in potentially
non-secure environments to create more flexible security systems.
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3. RANDOM CONTEXT GRAMMARS.
The properties of Random Context Grammars [10] provide some
interesting ways in handling circumstances where it is necessary to
determine theoccurrence, presenceor absenceof eventsor conditions,
or even a combination thereof, anywhere in a formal presentation of
the string being examined, e.g. [9] and [10].
A random context grammar [8] is a 4-tuple G = (V N' V T , P , S) ,
where V N , V -and Shave the usual formal language meaning, and P
is a finite set of productions of the form A ~ a ( U; T) where
AEVN,aE(VNuVT)+,U,T~VN,UnT=0. U is called the
permitting context, and T is called the forbidding context
Assume x=a1Aa z is a sentential string over (V NUV T)+. The
production A ~ a (U ;T) can be applied to x, resulting in Y =a 1a"az,
if
(i) all elements of U appear somewhere in al a z, and
(ii) no element of T appearsanywhere in a 1 a ~
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The language L(G) generated by G, is defined as
LCG) = {w/w E v; A S* ~ w} where * ~ has the usual formal
language meaning.
4. PATH CONTEXT GRAMMAR
The objective is to define a path context grammar, (PC-grammar),
which will generate valid access path, depending on the context
restrictions of the production rules. Bydescribing the grammar and its
operation rather informally the intention is to illustrate the controlling
mechanism of the grammar.
Assume the following environment E
Accessors
Objects
Domain
A={A I,A 2··A t •• A r }
0= {O I. 0z, .. 0 j •• Ot}
D = {D I.D z•••D t }
To illustrate how such a Grammar functions, a number of
examples have been used to show how restrictions are
enforced. To achieve this objective in a clear and simplistic
manner, a unique variable V j which is associated with Object
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OJ has been introduced to reflect the secured object prior to
granting access. If access to 0 j is permitted, 0 j will be
substituted for V j thus resulting in a terminal symbol. This
simulates the comparison of the baggage against the security
profile. Otherwise the generation will terminate without a
terminal string. Set V = {V 1. V 2 •• ' V t}. LetV T = AUOuD·be
the set of terminal symbols and V N =VU{S, S} the set of
non-terminal symbols. Note thatVis notthe traditional Vwhich
represents V NU V T.
The PC grammar now is
G = (V N' V T' P, S) which can now be applied to the
environment which has been described above.
(a) . S ~ AtS D k V jwhere V j is the unique variable associated with
object0 r This production means thatanysubiect.t.can claim
. .
access to any object 0 j which exists in domain D k » S is the
start symbol of the defined PC grammar.
(b) 1 sts«
...
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(c) S ~ D r
Using productions (b) and (c), any access path, via any domain,
between Ai and V j (representing 0 ),can be generated. The result
after a number of attempts may be x = AiD2D3D6DaV j where
D 2. D 3. D 6 and D a are valid domains. Because V J is not a terminal
symbol in the PC-grammar, x is not a terminal string, and therefore
not (yet) a valid access path. The objective is that V J will change to
o it signifying thegranting ofaccess ofA ito 0 j ifand onlyifthe relevant
conditions concerning domain crossings, had been satisfied. Suppose ,-
now that A i can only access OJ if
(i) A i is cleared to access 0 / ,
(ii) domains D k 1 ' D k2' ••• , D kr must have been used with an
access class of Passthru, and
(iii) no connection has been made with domains Dt I" ••• , D t n.
(d) The production Vj~Oj(Ai,Dkl .••• ,Dkr;Dt}, •.• ,Dtn)
where Ai' D k 1, ••• ' D kr represent permitting conditions and
Dt}, .•. D tn forbidding conditions in this production, will now
enforce precisely the conditions described above. In this way,
anydomainconditions can be included inthe final production
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which in the final instance, determines whether access is
granted byexamining the "history' ofthe access pathgeneration
process up to that specific stage.
To illustrate the concepts, another example which is based on
the following environment is presented
Assume the following in an environment E
t = {A I, A 2 • A 3 , A 4 } as the set of accessors,
a = {O 1. O 2 • 03} as the set of objects,
0= {Dl,D2.D3,D4.Ds.D6} as the set of domains, and
V = {V 1. V 2. V 3} as the set of unique object associated
variables as defined previously.
let V T = tva U 0 be the set of terminal symbols and
V n = {V 1. V 2. V 3. S •s} the set of non-terminal symbols.
<
The PC-grammar now is :
G = (V N • V T • P •S).where P is defined below. (Note : only
a subsetof P has been defined).
Also assume the following restrictions ofaccessors andobjects
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Only A 1 and A 2may access 0 1
0 1 resides in domain D 5
A 1and A 2can only access 0 1 via domains D 1. D 4 and
D~ or via domains D 1. D s and D 6
Access by A 1 to 0 1 may not be via domains D 2and D 3
and access by A 2to 0 1 may not be via D:c .
The following productions in 0 will now enforce these
conditions :
(a) S~AiSD5Vl 1 ~i s 4
(b) S~DiS 1 ~i s 6
(c) S~Di
(d) V 1 ~ 0 1 (A I. Dl. D4. DS: D 2.D 3 )
(e) V 1 -ro 1(A I. D 1.D s.D 6 : D 2 • D 3 )
(f) V 1 ~ 0 1 (A 2.Dl,D 4.D s :D 2 )
(g) V 1 ~ 0 1 ( A 2. D 1. D 6. D 5 : D 2)
Productions (a) to (c) can generate any access path between
any accessor Ai' 1 s i ~·4and V I'
Productions (d) to (g) control the actual granting of access. Only
A 1 and A 2 appear in the permitting contexts of these
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productions, hence should any other A l» i# 1,2 be selected
inproduction 1, thegeneration will terminatewithoutaterminal
string.
Production (d) requires an access path including domainsD 1,
D 4andD ~ and excluding domainsD 2and D e- This forces the
access path to either passthru' via D 1 and D 4 to D 5, without
initiating a session with D 2 or D~ The other productions are
similarly explained.
Note that the only reason why the validity of the access path
could be checked was due to the availability of the complete
history, termed the baggage, of the generation process. Given
appropriate baggage it is possible to control access to objects
to any degree of granularity using the components in E.
5. PC-LANGUAGES.
The language generated by a PC-grammar G = (V N , V T , P , S) is
L(G)={w/weAtaOj,At,OjeVT,aeV; and S~*w}. L(G)
consists of all valid access paths as specified by the production rules
in P.
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6. EXTENDED PC-GRAMMARS.
Path context grammars are "pure" random context grammars but are,
per their definition, however, not powerful enough to describe some
of the problematical situations in an environment E. For example
specific sequencesofdomain occurrences in the generated accesspath
or adjacency of domains in the path cannot be checked. If there isan
access control requirement that a session with domain D t must be
initiated immediately after domain D j had been exited, the model
defined in the previous section is not powerful enough to provide
access control. It is, however, possible to extend the model by allowing
the permitting and forbidding context conditions of the production
rules to be context sensitive. Obviously this holds for any component
A , D , S , I , 0 in an environment E.
Assume that < X ; Y > indicates that X must occur directly adjacent to
Y in a sentential string. Using this terminology in permitting and
.
forbidding contexts conditions, enforcement of domain adjacency or
forbidding thereof is possible.
Assuming the example in section 4 contained an additional
requirement that the access path had to initiate sessions from domain
D 1 directly to domain D 6 or from D 6 to D 1 the production (e) would
. be changed to V 1 ~ 0 1 (A 1. < D 1.D 6 > , D 5 ; D 2. D 3). This introduces
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the enforcement of more stringent criteria to the extent that specific
access paths could be specified as pre-requisites for access to objects
whilst others could be prohibited. In this case < D 1 , D 6 > specifies
that both D 1 and D 6 need to be present in any order. Assuming that
the presence of D 1 and D 6 as well as their fixed adjacency are
cornpulsory.Dxis requiredtofollowD 1, itisspecified as-c D l,D 6 ».
Potentially any restriction can be specified without loss of generality.
Given the notation in an environment E it is possible to include an
indication of the integrity class of a domain such as differentiating
whether the domain or a specific component is secure or insecure.
This can be indicated by substituting the symbol D for a domain to
D(I j) thus indicating that domain D has integrity class I j.
Production (b) inthe example now becomes toS ~ DiU j)S. Integrity
class I 1 could for example mean that the data has been encrypted
during transfer from one domain to another domain.
The symbols D i (11) D j (I t) in a sentential string therefore means that
any data transmitted from D i to D J must be encrypted. By using this
extension, as well as the context sensitivity of context conditions, the
power of the model is significantly enhanced. To illustrate this an
example is presented.
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Assume the following additional requirements to the specifications in
section 4 :
o 1 is a secure object, and can only be accessed via either a
dedicated line without encryption, or via a dial-up line, but
then using encryption;
the lines from domain D 1 to D 4 and from D 4 to D 5 are dial-up
lines; and
the lines from domainD 1 to D 6, D 1 to D 5, D 6 to D 5 and from
D 5 to D 1 are dedicated lines.
Assuming that! 1 indicates that transmission has been encryptedwhile
1 2 indicates the contrary. The resulting productions of the extended
PC-grammar will now be
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The following conclusions can now be made
(i) Production (e) requires domains D l' D s and. D 6 to be
connectedto inanyorder but withoutanyothersessions being
introduced. The integrity class of D 1 is not necessarily I 11 thus
not enforcing encryption even though it mayhave been done.
(ii) Production (d) requires connections directly from D 1 to D 4 to
D 5 in that order, but as the integrity class of D 1 and D 4 isIII
encryption is required.
(iii) There still remains the issue of preventing a domain from
appearingmore than once in a generated access path. This is
reasonable as multiple sessions with the same domain is
possible in reality. In the exampleabove an access path string
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x may be created as follows
The restrictions of production (e) above can be applied to x,
resulting in A 1gaining access to 0 11 as the specified conditions
are apparently satisfied. There is, however, an additional
session between D 11 D 5 and D 4 in that order, which is not
allowed. This results from a production beingsatisfied provided
it finds at least one set of conditions satisfying its context
conditions, and which is true for x. This is an inherent
characteristic of random context grammars and it will therefore
be necessary to check (e) whether all domains D 1 appearing
are adjacent to a D <It and not only onel This is easily done with
t~e use of classical manipulation techniques in the field of
Random Context Grammars.
9. CONCLUSION.
-
The reason for presenting this chapter somewhat informally is to
illustrate the power of a relatively simple model in computer
environments where security isa major problem area. It utilises simple
production rules yet the principles of baggaging [e.g. logging] can be
Page 63.
simulated in complex, multidomain computer environments•.
Initially this application of Random Context Grammars may appear
simplistic, but experimentation suggests that a wide variety of
heterogeneous computer systems such as LANS connected to hosts
each utilising its own array of software components can' be
accommodated. In fact, the more complex the environment the more
clearly and effective the model becomes. This is mainly the result of
. introducing the concepts of baggaging and access paths.
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APPLICATION OF THE PATH CONTEXT MODEL
SYNOPSIS
At this stage the reader has been exposed to the
path context model and its implication as well as .
the underlying theory which is based on Random
Context Sensitive Grammars.
This chapter has been structured to illustrate its
application in complex computer environments
and to establish the principles whereby the path
context model can assist to automate computer
security. Specific areas covered are hetero"
geneous multidomain computer environments,
non-secure environments, automated security
profile generation, automated exposure evaluation
and automated security package evaluation. The
objective Is to highlight the power of the path
context model in sophisticated computer
environments.
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1. INTRODUCTION.
Thelastfewyears have placed reneweddemandson computersecurity
as organisations have increasingly automated more of their activities.
Technology has evolved rapidly overthe same period to the extent that
automation could be done at affordable costs. Resulting from this
deployment of technology has been very large and complex systems
which handle substantial activity volumes. Securing these kinds of
environments requires an alternative perspective of computer security,.
in the sense that there are demands for f1exi-secure approaches,
automated profile generation and automated exposure and security
package evaluation.
Toachieve security in complex computer environments has proved to
be a formidable task and consequently the research projecton which
this chapter is based was undertaken. Although the initial scop~ was
solely directed at computer security in complex systems, it was found
necessary to re-visit many of the fundamental concepts inorder to gain
a better understanding ofthe main issues. In addition itwasfound more
efficient to utilise a Random ContextGrammar [8] to describea model
c which iscapable of accommodating complex technologies.
The purpose of this chapter is firstly to review some of the potential
security problems which are associated withcomplex systems. Asimple
classification of multi-domain systems and those which allow multiple
executions in a single address space has been used. Such phenomena
are knownto give rise to potentially non-secure conditions. local area
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networks, wide .area networks and all facets of distributed and
co-operative processing fall under the former while environmental
software such as teleprocessing monitors and database management
systems under the latter. Secondly, the whole question of f1exi-secure
approaches,automatic profile generation, automatic risk evaluation and
computerassisted package assessment is dealtwith using a path context
model.
Itis stressed at the outsetthat it is'not beingadvocated that the approach,.
adopted in this chapter is the onlyapproach, or, at this stage, that it is
perfect Thepathcontextmodel which is described in thischapterdoes,
however, address many of the known security concerns in complex
potentially non-secure systems effectively and with a high degree of
efficiency. Also of importance is its ability to provide a basis for
automating many of the traditional manual security processes, a typical
example beingmaintenance of security profiles.
Tofacilitate a comprehensive discussion, the chapter has been divided
intosections which deal with security issues and the application of the
Path ContextModel in the environments which have been mentioned
above while the remaining describe the flexibility and automation of
computer security administration and evaluation.
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2. MULTI-DOMAIN SYSTEMS
Multi-domain systems manifest themselves by the presence of more
than one domain which consists of one or more of Wide Area Networks
(WAN), Local Area Networks (LANS), Value Added Networks (VAN),
Intelligent Data Terminal Equipment (IDTE) and distributed processing
wheresystem, data and/orapplication functionality could be distributed.
In themselves a multi-domain system not necessarily create the
problems; their implementation and features actually originate them.
Typical examples are:
Dynamic rather than user initiation of various network sessions.
Dynamic initiating and rerouting of network sessions in other
domains.
Use of multiple system software components to carry out simple
on-line requests for processing or retrieving information.
Transparent multi-domain access to data.
Transparent multi-domain application functionality.
loss of single user or individual identity during the processing
path.
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Dynamic sharing of routines and processes among multiple
software components.
Parallel and/or concurrent execution of processes.
Toillustrate these concepts a hypothetical system has been constructed,
fig. 1.
Figure 1
LAN VAN WAN WAN
51 53 56 59
'---
52 54 57 510
. ~
1 2 i 1 2 j 1 2
~
~ .
D 58 511 ~'---
u ~ ~R1 R2
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Fig 1. which consists of four domains covering a LAN, VAN and two
WANS. The example provides the following service requests :
(a) A primaryaccessorA 1signs onto a LAN denoted domain D 1 and utilises
software components S 1 and. S 2 with integrity I I, representing for
example problem state integrity and K I passthru' access class. F I is
accessed for read only. S 2 dynamically initiates a VAN session in
domain D2using a transformed accessorA~
(b) Within D 2system softwarecomponent S 3 is used with integrity state I 1
and access class K 2as above. S 3 in turn initiates a session in D 3 by
means of transformed accessor A 30
(c) In D 3 • S 6, S 7 and S 8 are used with S 7 initiating another accessor
transformation toA 4' Integrity state I 1 and access class K 2applyexcept
that an application program denoted S 72 , formed by S 7 and an
application program block 2 in figure 1, has an integrity state I 20
(d) S 8 in turn initiates a session in D 4 with transformed accessor A s-
S 9. S 10, and S II are similar to D 4 with the only exception that F 4 is
accessed with, say, an access classdenoting update to elements R I and
R 2 •
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The following represent the various baggage vectors for every domain
where the symbols are as used througout this dissertation and already
accommodate the access class where appropriate. Note that any
particular domain does not recognise the identity of the accessors
external to itself and therefore the need for transformation.
The complete baggage vector BV c is simply a concatenated string of
the above, i.e. BV c =BV v} II BV v211 BV v311 BV V4'
It is shown in chapter 5 that computer security is based on the construct
of restricting the capabilities of individuals in such a way that
organisational segregation of duties is enforced. The o"nly ind,ividual in
the example which isdescribed in figure 1 is, in fact, A 1and the objective
is then to determine whether A 1 can in fact gain access to R 1 and R 2
with a certain access class. In addition it is shown that unless there is
a one to one mapping between the primary accessors and the
transformed ones, or the baggage vector is comprehensive enough to
deduce this, the system is non-secure. The implication of fig. 1 is that
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unless A 1 actually "owns" A 2 • A 3 • A 4 and A 5 exclusively or that st> cis
available to the validator when R 1 and R 2 are accessed the system is
potentially non-secure as it cannot be determined conclusively that it
is, in fact, A 1 which is accessing R 1 and R 2.
At this point ad hoc, trial and error, scenario and/or if approaches are
often resorted to in an attemptto introduce some security into thesystem.
Where a large number of users, computer activities, devices and
domains are present, the task is formidable. The issue now becomes
of illustrating how the Path Context Model can be used to deal with
such situations. Bearing in mind that the ultimate objective is to
determine whether a primary accessor which requires access to objects
operates within the scope of their segregation of duties in the
organisation, the following steps address the process :
(a) .Define the primary accessors.
(b) Define the resources to be accessed, e.g. files, data elements, etc.
(c) Determine the underlying access paths.
(d) Determine the BaggageVector in every domain which could vary
from system control blocks to logging mechanisms.
...
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(e) Insofar as the complete Baggage Vector or even the underlying
Baggage Vectors contain insufficient information to permit
conclusive proof that the computer security objectives have been
achieved, there are potential security exposures.
(f) Sometimesthe environment can be simplified by not making use
of some of the features thereby providing the basis for being able
to secure the system. For example in fig. 1 A 1 need not sign on
to the LAN but directly onto D 3 thus eliminating the necessity to
deal with D 1 and D 2 from a security perspective.
To formalise this process generically the following steps are provided
which use PCM and the underlying structure :
i. Define the set of access paths P in environment E within which
computer security needs to be implemented.
ii. Define the setof Baggage Vectors BVaccording to the cap~bilities
of the Baggage Collection Vehicle.
iii. Insofar asBV is deficient in that it cannot accommodate the full
set of access paths, security exposures exist thus creating a
potentially non-secure environment. The capabilities of the
baggage collection vehicle is therefore the major determinant of
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the environment's securability.
It isconcluded that provided an environmentEcan be defined in terms
of D. S • I •a and A and the Baggage Collection Vehicle is adequate
anyenvironmentwhich could be contemplatedwassecurable provided
that the Security Profile and/or the Validator did not imposeany further
constraints.
3. MULTIPLE EXECUTIONS IN SINGLE ADDRESS SPACES (MESAS)
A phenomena which is frequently encountered in modern mainframe
system software design is the execution of subtasks such as application
programs in the same address space and under the control of a
controlling task. Typical examples include teleprocessing monitors and
database managementsystems.
Usingfig. 1 asan example,S .. S -and S 10 represent componentswhich
utilise a MESAS architecture. Underthese circumstances itis not unusual
that an accessor say A 3 gains access to S 7. Once S 7 is activated,
however, S 7 assumes control on behalf of A 3 but gains execute and
passthru' access to application program S 7 J and S 8 respectively in its
own right as accessorA + All subsequent initiated service requests take
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place under the auspices of A 4unless further accessor transformation
takes place. In fact it can be said as a general statement that MESAS
principles usually involve :
(a) Some form of accessor transformation.
(b) Transformed accessor controlovera significant, ifnot all, portion
of subsequent activities.
(c) Where an application program, sayS 7 i' isan integral component
inrestricting the capabilities ofan individual and MESAS principles
are present, there is a high probability that S 7 i needs to be
contributedtowardsa baggage vectorto ensureeffective security.
This ~oncept can be formalised bysimply stating that any MESAS based
software component which cannot contribute to baggaging where
functionality is incorporated as, say, subtasks that f~nctionality is
non-secure. Contribution to the baggage vector via the baggage
collection vehicle may be inherent in the software itself or installation
written and includes the environment's control blocks, statuswords, logs
and vectors.
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By way of conclusion it is stated that software which is MESAS based
and often classified as non-secure, can be accommodated by PCM as
another integrity state and the exposure assessed by the baggage
t;
deficiencies which mayexist.
4. FLEXI-SECURITY.
Multi-domain environments are often characterised by large numbers
of primary accessors, activities and hence access paths. Many activities
often require no security, classed as public domain, whilst other may
require a very high degree ofsecurity. The impracticability of securing
everything to the highest level requirements and the resulting
administrative burden is well known and requires no further comment.
Of interest then is to explore the possibility of a security system .in an
environment E which is capable of differentiating among access paths
and applying different rules depending on the circumstances. For
example certain activities may be classed as only accessible via
encrypted lines whileother may be available viaVANS. The definition
of PCM as a Baggaging Collection Vehicle and Security Profile with the
validator matching the two achieves this as follows :
(a) Assuming that the Baggage Collection Vehicle is effective, it is only
necessary to concentrate on the security profile.
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(b) Within the Security Profiles any production is possible as the
specification as described in chapter 2 can accommodate any
component in E. In addition conditions which can reflect fixed
or random adjacency are possible together with compulsory or
prohibitive contexts. Either are able to handle restrictions of the
nature as described previously. The power of Random Context
Grammars allow very effective and efficient handling of simple
and complexSecurity Profiles which in fact permits a f1exi-secure
approach. Amorerigourous treatmentoftheseconceptshasbeen.
presented in chapter 3.
5. AUTOMATED COMPUTER SECURITY SUPPORT.
Having introduced complex computer environments and f1exi-secure
principles, it is ·submitted that unless support for security in. such
environments can be automated, it is unlikely that workable security
.
can be effectively implemented and maintained without substantial
administration support. The real benefitof this type of research project
wouldthereforelieinits ability to providethe ground rules forstructuring
automated computer security support. Three areas, namelyautomatic
profile generation, automatic risk evaluation and computer assisted
security package evaluation have been explored using PCM.
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5.1. Automatic Profile Generation.
Let PCM be the grammar with specifications which define the baggage
collection vehicle (BCV) and security profile (SP). The Validator then
serves asthe mechanismwhich comparesthe underlying Baggage Vector
(BV) and Security Profile derivations and allocates a value of TRUE if
the security profile can be derived from the Baggage Vector and FALSE
if not By introducing a notation of individual accessor profiles S P j
representing deviations of S P the foundation for automatic profile.
generation can be established. An accessor profile S P j is defined as
well constructed iff :
(a) It must be derived from BeY.
(b) It is well formed by containing derivations which incorporate
A , D , S ,1 and o.
(c) There is closure to the extent of mapping the primary accessor
A 1 with secured objects to which A 1 has access.
An Automatic Profile Generator can therefore be described as an
automaton which generates well constructed accessor profilesS P jfrom
an external input source. The formalism already achieved resolves the
details about the automatic profile generator itself while giving rise to
questionsabout the input Chapter 5 providesground rulesto determine
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the capabilities of the various primary accessors and provides insight
intointerrelationships between the various componentssuchaspolicies,
users, ownership access rights, etc. It is submitted that unless these
criteria can be incorporated into the computer system by means of
resources such as a resource data directory, true automatic profile
generationisimpracticable. Theimplications are thatthis typeofsecurity
problemisno longer solely a function ofcomputersecurity systems, but
should, in fact, migrate to other areas thus necessitating a shared
responsibility for computer security. Essentially the inadequacy of
security theoryor techniquesare no longer the limitation factor. Chapter
3 for example introduces a high degree of formalism to a number of
computersecurity issues. In practical termsitmeansthat the theoretical
foundations to automatically generate wellconstructed security profiles
exist provided that appropriate external input is available.
5.2. Automatic Risk Evaluation.
Using the notation which was used to introduce Automatic Profile
Generation the definition of risk is defined as
(a) S P j not being derivable from the BeV.
(b) BV and S P j not beingwell formed.
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(c) BVand S P } not being closed.
Essentially this means that risk can be viewed as the set of partial
derivations which results from (a), (b) and (c) above. Risk is therefore
the elements in the derivations which, ifthey were included in the above
definitions, would haveconstituted no risk. Riskcan be further extended
to reduce the probability of primary accessors exceeding their security
profile by means of "Unauthorised Access'. Under these circumstances
compulsory and/or prohibitive conditions have been introduced against.
secured objects, i.e. 0 (B ; F ) with B being compulsory and Fprohibitive
conditions. The term "conditions" broadly means any derivation ofBV.
In real world environments it is a fairly trivial exercise to model the
Baggage Collection Vehicle and Security Profile to determine the risks
based on the above-mentioned criteria. The more complex the
environment being addressed, the more effective PCM has been found
to deal with risk, particularly in multiple heterogeneous cross domain
environments.
5.3.' Automatic Package Evaluation.
There are two ways in which this approach can be applied to assist with
the evaluation of a computer security package :
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(a) Use the principles which have been described under automatic
profile generation. Insofar as the various package's security
profiles cannot accommodate the S P j which can be described
as requirements, the package is deficient
(b) UsetheAutomatic Risk Evaluation criteria to the extentofapplying
them to an environment F and determining whether the package
addresses the risks or, alternatively, apply them to the security
package and determiningthe potential risk. ThepowerofRandom ..
Context Grammars provide very interesting opportunities in
modelling various security alternatives. Toappreciatethisa great
deal of formalism is required. Chapter 3 contains further detail
in this regard.
6. CONCLUSION..
Acomputersecurity model termeda Path ContextModel whichi~ based
on Random Context Grammars hasbeen appliedwith interesting results
in complex computer environments which could be classified as
potentially non-secure according to traditional security theory. It also
provides the basis for defining and structuring automated computer
security support
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The advantage of this approach is the efficient and effective way in
which controversial security issues can be handled. Its real potential,
however, lies in providing the basis for automatic profile generation,
automatic risk evaluation and automatic package evaluation.
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COMPUTER SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS
Synopsis
The previous chapters have concentrated on
the path context model, the underlying theory
and its application. One area, however, has
been omitted as it deals with business or
organisational administrative issues. Thisarea
originates from problems In determining where
the rules which are necessary to automate
computer security support (chapter 4)
. originates. Itwas deemed necessary to explore
computer security fundamentals further and
attempt to introduce some formalism.. Whilst
the article which relates to this chapter covers
the fundamentals it doesnot introduce complex
theory as it requires extensive multi-disci-
plinary skills. An attempt has, however, been
made in Appendix A to formalise the principles
as a basis to stimulate further research.
1.
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INTRODUCTION.
It isgenerally accepted that computer security is associated with the control
of access and protection of computer controlled resources. Whilst this may
appear tobe a fai rly obviousstatement,thereare nevertheless difficulties when
one is trying to deal with the potential ambiquity of termssuch as protection,
control and resources. This is highlighted even further when attempting to
develop principles for the automation of security administration and access
control across multiple, heterogeneous computer system boundaries. It is
therefore a situation of not only dealing with the intricacies of security in
complex computer environments, but also to determine the 'resources"
requiring securing, on what basis this securing needs to be done and who the
various players are. One way of addressing these issues is to create an
organisational policy which reflects users and their positions, computer
controlled resources involved, the operationsthat need to be performed, the
domains forwhichthe policy applies, the authority to implement policies and,
finally, the access rules which reflect authority. Agood,exposition of this type
of approach is outlined in [12]. Essentially this attempts to mobilise an
organisation intodefining its security requirements. Itassumes that the various
people inanorganisation actually comprehendthe principles whichultimately
result inaccess restrictions, This is, however, sometimes not the case with the
result that computer security becomes an ad hoc exercise, often with many
flaws. Probably the bestway to illustrate this is byway of example. Assume
a situation where two business transactions T 1 and T 2 need to be performed
by two separate persons A 1 and A 2' Now assume that T 1 and T 2 are
subsequentlyautomated and incorporated intoone application program R P 1.
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Readers familiar with application development, even using CASE tools, are
very likely to be familiar with such situations. Often well-known application
packages incorporate this type of arrangement. A situation arises where the
business requires A 1 to have access to the T 1 component of R PI and A 2 to
the T 2 component in R PI. Obviously the question in security terms becomes
the definition of the resource to be protected; in this case the functions
embedded in R PI. Hopefully this simple example shows the necessity for
formalising the derivation of policy.
f' The objective of this chapter is to describe a framework or model which
provides insight into the complexities which underly computer security
principles. It takes the concepts in discussions such as [12) a step further by
attempting to explore organisational fundamentals. This chapter has been
derived from a research project which was aimed at providing an
understa~ding of security in potentially non-secure computer environments.
Computer environments which contain commercially available local area
networks, wide area networks, teleprocessing monitors and database
.
management systems often give rise to non-secure environments, usually as
a result of the architectures involved. These environments, however,
frequently require a high degree of computer security and riskevaluation and
hence this type of research has wide application.
One way of introducing some of the computer security fundamentals in
potentially non-secure systems is by way of example. The term potentially
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non-secure will become more obvious later on. Fig. 1 represents a fairly
conventional computer system with three primary accessors, A I, A 2 and A 3,
always individual persons, issuing requests to access various elements R 1 to
R 5 which are contained in a file F 1. R 1 to R 5 could represent data elements
in a database record of which the database itself is contained in Fl.
Figure 1
I :
I :
I :
J. :
I '
("
I
I
I
I
I
I
]1------------------------1
Assume that the restrictions that need to be enforced are that A 1should only
be able to access R 1 to R 4 in Fl' A 2 to R 1 and R 5 and A 3 can control or
manageF 1 withoutgainingaccess to the elements inF 1. In a typical computer
environment each primary accessor would initiate various system software
components, denoted S i for the i'" component, or application programs,
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denoted R Pifor the j th application program. To reflect the complete access
process, the concept of an access pathwhich is formed bythe various system
components that need to be activated to service requests is introduced. For
exampleA 1SIS 2R PIS 3F 1 R 3and A 3S 4 S sF 1 are two access paths in this
environment Obviously multiple access paths do exist, the issue being that
inanyenvironment Ethe numberof access pathsare finite. Ashortdiscussion
of some typical security problems are presented by reference to the above
example:
(a) The access paths which were used to illustrate its definition show
intuitively that simple object-subject relationships are no longer an
effective way of describing the security requirements in environments
such as in Fig. 1. This effectiveness of object-subject relationships is
further reduced byphenomena insystem software design which, firstly,
transforms the primary accessor, say A II to A 11 and A 12 for system
software components S 1 and S 2 which means that 'subsequent
activities are carried out under the capabilitie~ of a substitute or
transformed accessor. It implies that a more accurate description of
an access path would be AlSlS2AllRplS3A12FIR3 with F 1
"thinking" it is beingaccessed by A 12 using S 3' The fact that A 1 is the
individual actually initiating the request is often unknown from S 2
onwards thus forcing reliance on system integrity or proxy access. This
isall verywellinsecurecomputerenvironments, exceptthat potentially
"..
Page 85.
unsecure environments, e.g. multi-domain componentswith multiple
executions insingle addressspacemaygive rise tocircumstances where
significant exposures arise.
Secondly, system software, such as a data base management system,
may incorporate principles whereby, say, S acontrols all accessto the
elements in Fl' S 3 usually demands unrestricted or universal access
to F 1 with no consideration to the restrictions that apply to A t- ,
Thirdly, applications can be developed in such a way that access to
multiple system functionality is allowed. For example R P 1 could be
used to access R 1 to R 5 by incorporating multiple functions which
access the various elements in it Unless these individual functions in
R PI can be protected as objects, A 1cannot be restricted to R 1 to R 3
asRPI' defined as one object,allows access to all the data elements.
By defining e~erything as bothobjects and subjects withthe underlying
complex and multiple security interrelationships in any sizeable
environment the result can only be described as ad hoc and intuitive
with significantclosure and accuracy risks inmaintaining the underlying
system.
(b) The security implemented in the access paths which are used by Al
and A 2 in Fig. 1 is irrelevant asA 3 uses a separateaccesspath defined
"..
(c)
(d)
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How is it actually determined what AI ..• A 3 can access and are
restrictions in the access paths necessary? Ad hoc approaches or
exhaustive interviewing seem very antiquated and risky in relation to
the technology being applied in complex environments.
Thenumber of permutations thatneed to be thoughtthrough in large
systems make an intuitive "protect all" strategy impracticable in most
environments.
The above has been presented to illustrate the motive for researching more
formal frameworks which can accommodate computer security issues in a
more scientific manner. Of particular significance, however, is to question
whatcomputersecurity isall about as is evidentfrom the above example that
there is both a organisational administrative and technology component
involved.
('
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2. COMPUTER SECURllY FUNDAMENTALS
Principles of internal control in organisations have received a great deal of
attention over the lastfew decades to the extent that they provide a sound
point of departure for deriving formal propositions relating to computer
security, particularly in commercial environments. ., Although numerous
references which deal with internal control are available, [11] is presented as
an internationally acceptable source of reference. Its usefulness further
extends to its coverage of computer environments.
Theobjective ofcomputersecurity or protection ofany resource isultimately
an organisational issue. For example the components that need to besecured
and the degreeof security required can, and often is, overridden by business
principles. It is submitted that these so-called business principles are not
always understood and is oftena sourceofconfusion. Even ifa perfectmodel
ofcomputersecuritycouldbedevelopedand itcouldnot reflectorganisational
orbusiness related principles, there isa high probability thatits implementation
would not be successful. This is particularly evidentwhen the' potential for
automated computer security support is explored. As a result it was found
necessary to introduce some formalism into the organisational arena as it
ultimately affects computersecurity,
A convenient point to initiate a discussion of this nature is with the
organisation's business activities. Consider a hierarchy which deals with
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businessactivities inan organisation intermsofvalidity, authorisation, approval
and segregation ofduties. Validity refers to business activities intermsof being
lawful, within the scope of the organisation's constitution and in terms of
organisational policy. To ensure validity, however, it is necessary that any
activity be authorised as beingvalid. Authorisation can be achievedexplicitly
by a technique of somebody simply approving an activity or implicitly by
dividing the activity intoa numberof sub-activities whichare then performed
by a number of different persons. Authorisation is then said to be implicitly
achieved on the basis that the involvement of a number of persons provides
an acceptable degree of risk that the activity is valid. The same holds for
retrieval of information aswell as privacy and confidentiality. Fig. 3 represents
this structure diagrammatically.
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Figure J
VALIDITY
Lawful
Constitution
Policy
AUTHORISATION
I
I I
AUTHORISATION AUTHORISATION
Explicitly Implicitly by
Approved Division of Duties
I
I I
MANUAL COMPUTERISED
Physical Computer
Division of Security
Duties
It is submitted that where explicit authorisation takes place by an approval
process, nosegregation ofduties at a level belowthat of the approval process
.
is necessary. This implies that a complex segregation of duties, hierarchy in
addition to an approval process constitutes redundancy. This process is
evident in a small organisation where the owner by means of an approval
process negates the need of a large staff complementwhich is necessary for
implicit authorisation. The latter again is often found in larger organisations.
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Now consider the person in a manual environment who is responsible for
determining the procedures according to which business, and therefore
segregation of duties, isconducted. The principle isquite simple. That person
cannot participate in an implicit authorisation process as this could
compromise the process. Consequently business system and proced~resare
documented by independent persons and an authorisation process is applied
to it, that is explicitlyor implicitly. In the event of this set of manual activities
being computerised, the same principles apply. Byimplementing segregation
of duties in the form of a programmer, operator, or security administrator the
implicitauthorisation of the computerised systemsand procedures isachieved.
If it were possible to obtain reliable explicit authorisation of a system, the
above may not be necessary. In a micro computer environment one person
is capable of performing all the roles; hence the issues which arise when
attempting to introduce security.
In complex computer environments with a significant number of components
the implicit authorisation process of systems and procedures is far more
involved. One would therefore expect more segregation of duties and hence
more functions need to be introduced. From the user side the issue is
somewhat simpler. In the event of any business transaction which has been
decomposed into multiple sub-transactions performed by different individuals
to achieve implicit authorisation and then subsequently computerised, the
same principle applies. This means that one has to examine the segregation
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of duties in a computer environment in exactly the same way as a manual
one. Itisnot a question ofarbitrary policy or protection of resources, but that
of generally accepted business internal control procedures.
Theconclusion which can be drawnfrom the above is simple yetfar ~eaching.
Itimplies thatcomputersecurity isthe techniquewherebysegregation ofduties
is enforced in a computer environment. Per definition unauthorised access
or unauthorised disclosure can beviewedasa contravention ofthe segregation.
ofduties principles. Itis, however, necessary to introduce the concept of risk.
'In a manual environment masquerading by means of forged signatures does
occur. Thedegreeof control and supervision over the process affects the risk.
Similarly the nature and extent of computer security is used to achieve the
same objective. Note that in both instances absolute control cannot be
achieved as authorisation always has a degree of inherent risk.
Itis not the intention of thischapter to introduce any formalism as an 'informal
approachwasdeemed to provide aclearerpresentation. However, an attempt
has been made in appendix Ato this chapter to formalise these concepts by
making use of regular set theory. Having established some basic principles,
. their impact on the study of computer security fundamentals is considered
significantand therefore presentedinthe followingsections. Theterm"Validity
Hierarchy' has been adopted to represent the fundamental concepts which
underly computersecurity.
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3. SEGREGATION OF DUTIES AND COMPUTER SECURITY
Having established a conceptual foundation which focuses on the Validity
Hierarchy and access paths, it is possible to experimentwith various issues
surrounding computersecurity as well as to substantiate the useful~ess of the
approacheswhich have been adopted.
3.1. ComputerSecurity as Implementing Segregation of Duties.
It is possible in practice to develop a validity hierarchy for an organisation
which reflects the segregation ofdutieswhichare necessary to authorise those
business activities which are best done so implicitly. In addition redundant
procedures may be introduced arbitrarily to further reduce the risk of error
and/orfraud. Assume someofthese business activities havebeen automated.
Theonlywayinwhich an individual can perform thesecomputerised activities
is byactivatingan accesspath(in Fig. 1),sayAl SIS 2 R PIS 3 FIR 3 to perform
activity.T 1. If A 1 represents an individual with the delegated right to perform
T 1 there is no problem. IfAI' say, is not entitled to perform T 2' (which, for
example, couldresult ina service requestS 1 S2R P2S 3F 1 R 1), and an access
path A 1SIS 2 R P2 S 3 FIR 1 exists, or SIS 2 R P2 S 3 FIR 1 is available to
everyone, then some major. concerns are evident Essentially being
represented is the similarity between segregation of duties and computer
security. This implies that, in the event of the new access paths which are .
available in computerenvironment E not reflecting organisational structures,
(,
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there is a major problem. Assume that one application program R P T
incorporated the functionality of R PI, R P2 and R P'3' Unless it is possible to
construct a baggage collection vehicle and a security profile (see section 5)
which differentiates between the various functions in R PT a situation arises
where computer security serves little purpose. The key is not simply to
implement security on whatever access paths are present to satisfy an
uninformed audience, but to have computer security reflect the required
organisational segregation of duties. The result is that unless a security system
can be synthesised such that certain requirements are met, the computer
security system is ineffective and a situation entailing risk is present. The
following criteria are proposed :
(a) Valid activities by means of implicit authorisation are only possible if
the security system and the access paths meet the organisational
. prerequisites in terms of segregation of duties.
(b) In the event of the computer environment E containing additional
access paths, it implies that computer activities which exceed business
restrictions are possible.
(c) Where the computer environment E and the security system cannot
reflect business segregation of duties requirements at the level of an
3.2.
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individual person, then E has not necessarily been constructed to
accommodate the business requirements. Acomputersecuritysystem
may in place but has limited application.
In this context all security related policies, administrative arrangem7nts and
approachesare aimedat ensuring the effective implementation and operation
of segregation of duties with the use of a computer security system as a
technique in a computer environment. This affects the definition ofterms.
suchas protection and resource which havelittle meaning ina large computer
environment.
Linking Individuals and Accessors.
In a computer environment E which incorporates a security system, one can
introduce the concept of unactivated access paths on the basis that theycan
be predetermined withouthaving to actually usethem. An unactivated access
path can accordingly be said to contain unactivated accessors. For example
an access path A 1SIS 2 RPIS 3 FIR 3 is onlyactivated when the unactivated
accessor A 1 is associated with an individual person. In this context the
identification and authentication ofan accessor bywhatevermeansonlyserves
in establishing a link between the personand unactivated accessor. Itserves
no purpose in the enforcementof segregation of duties. This is important as
an organisation can spend vastamounts of moneyand other resources on this
(.
3.3.
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aspect without taking cognisance of the further restrictions that need to be
applied. The end resultcould be a sophisticated encryption system but yet
security being ineffective for other reasons. Unless a security profile which
details the accessors rights is associated with the accessor at the correct level
of granularity within the various access paths, E issaid to be non-secure.
Encryption.
A great deal of literature is available on encryption and this chapter is not
intended to discuss the techniques available. Instead it is deemed important
to considerthe role of encryption in the light of this approach to security.
Firstly it is submitted that access to information is a natural component of
segregation of duties in the sense that an authorisation function is involved.
The access to information can therefore be explicitly or implicitly authorised
on the same principles which have already been dealt with in this section.
Encryption is therefore considered as a technique whereby information
relating to. access paths and security systems is transformed to prevent
disclosureofunderlying information whichcouId result insubsequentviolation
.ofsegregation of duties. In itself it serves no purpose in establishing whether
the validity hierarchy is complied with in the first place. This is the function
of the security system. Again this is significant in the sense that the presence
of encryption is a computer environment E which is potentially non-secure
may have limited effectiveness from an overall security perspective.
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3.4. Substitute Authorisation.
. Substitute authorisation, or proxy logins or any other process whereby
accessors are transformed willalwaysgive riseto non-secure conditions unless
one of the following apply :
(a) Given any primary accessor A 1 there is always a one-to-one mapping
between A 1 and any subsequent transformed accessors.
(b) In a given access path P enough information is collected within the
access path that when the object is accessed it can be determined
whether the primary accessor A 1 is permitted access to that object
within the context of the information which has been collected and
the security profile (see section 5) of A 1.
Unless one of these criteria are complied with, the security system cannot
establish compliance with the validity hierarchy and the environment is
non-secure.
3.5. 'Unauthorised Access.
Itissubmitted that unauthorised access isa natural extension of the segregation
ofduties concept Essentially it relates to the riskof a person correctly activating .
4.
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an unactivated accesspath. The issue becomesone of linking Individuals and
Accessors as described above.
PRINCIPLES OF PATH CONTEXT CONCEPTS.
The value of this more business-like approach to security fundamentals lies
inproviding a better understanding ofcomputersecurity fundamentals aswell
in itsapplication to real worldsecurity issues. Whilstformal derivation provides
evidence of theoretically sound concepts and propositions, their ability to
describe and provide solutions to these problems is the. ultimate test. This
section is presented as a natural evolution of classic computer security which
wasdeveloped inthe seventies. [1], [3], [5]. [6] and [7] document theseworks.
Firstly, it isgenerally accepted that a security system is adequate ifand only
if it consists of the following three components :
(a) Atracking mechanism ofaccessors and accesspaths,termed a baggage
collection vehicle in this chapter.
(b) A mechanism which describes and contains the restrictions which are
imposed on accessors and objects. This has been termed the security
profile.
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(c) A mechanism which applies the rules and restrictions which are
contained in the security profile to a specific value which is reflected
by the baggage collection vehicle during a particular access or service
request: The validator.
The reason for having introduced the Validity Hierarchy as a fundamental
element of computer security is hopefully now apparent Itestablishes a basis
for sound evaluation of computer security requirements and the riskof ad hoc
policies, standards and procedures which could even mirror the restrictions
of a particular computer security system. Ultimately an objective test needs
to confirm the adequacy of computer security or highlight exposures.
Security exposures can be defined as the degree of certainty which the three
components of a security system provides that the principles of validity
hierarchy can be implemented to meet organisational demands. This implies
that an evaluation of baggage deficiency, profile deficiency and validator
deficiency provide the key towards risk evaluation. Where the baggage
collection vehicle as reflected in the computer system's control blocks, task
vectors, logs and status words is incapable of recording events which are
cnecessary to meet the underlying specifications, an exposure exists. In
computer environments this would, for example, be reflected by a database
update which is controlled by the database management system which was
activated by an application program which in turn is controlled by a .
teleprocessing monitor. All the security system may see is the teleprocessing
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monitor and database management systems and a series of transformed
accessors. Thetrue identityofthe primary accessormayeven resideinanother
part of the network. On the other hand a security profile which is incapable
ofdescribing the necessary restrictions that need to be enforcedand avalidator
whichcannot detectexceptionssimilarlycreateexposures. Essentially all three
components need to be in placebefore implementation of computer security
is possible. Note that issues such as split baggage collection, use of multiple
physical mechanisms, or distributed security profiles do not affect the
underlying concepts provided that logically the security criteria are complied
with.
Even having the capability of building a very sophisticated security system
does not ensure complete success. It is like a safe; there is always a more
powerful device which iscapable of cracking it This introduces the concept
of risk which isa measureof robustness. Any computer security system which
is based on current technology is subject to risk mainly because of a
phenomena best termed discreteness. Discreteness refers ~o the separate
existence of the individual components which constitute the set of access
paths in a computer environmentE. As the individual accessor is separated
from the unactivated accessorthisgives rise to the risk of impersonation. Risk
can only be reduced by the capabilities of the securitysystem. The focus of
the research on which this chapter is based is in this area of modeling
requirements and security systems and matching them to determine exposures
and risk.
('.
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5. DESCRIPTION OF A PATH CONTEXT SECURITY SYSTEM.
Two aspectsconcerning computer security have now been introduced. Firstly
the concept of an access path as the various system components which are
activated to service requests to access computer controlled resources and,
secondly, the validity hierarchy. Obviously it is nownecessary to examine
their interrelationship in order to show how these concepts actually function.
Again a rather informal approach has been adopted as the principles are
deemed more important than their formal proof.
To explore the "interrelationship" mentioned, a number of options were
explored in the original research :
(a) Multi-tape Turing Machines.
(b) Multi-head Turing Machines.
(c) Context free grammars.
(d) n-Dimensional Context Sensitive Language.
(e) Random Context Sensitive Language.
(f) Graph Theory.
(g) Various calculus approaches.
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The following selection criteria were used to evaluate the suitability of the
above options :
(a) Its ability to describe possible productions of a security system.
(b) The degree of formalism which it could provide in accommodating
complex computer systems.
(c) Its ability to describe the dynamics of a security system with the
Validator applying the Security Profile to the Baggage Collection
Vehicle.
(d) Relative simplicity in applying it to the above items.
Turing machines and n-Dimensional ContextSensitive language satisfies all
the criteria except the pointwhich deals withapplication simplicity. 'Context
Free Grammars, graphtheoryand calculus approaches werediscarded on the
basis of an inability in their simple forms to describe the systems being
researched. By far the most powerful, yet simple, approach was the use of
Random ContextSensitive languages [8].
A useful way of defining a security system was found to be a Path Context
Model (PCM) which exists of three components, like any other security
system :
6.
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Aset of restrictions whichspecify the security restrictions to be applied
termed the Security Profile.
A mechanism which collects information from the computer system
during a service request against which the security profile ~an be
applied. This has been termed the baggage collection vehicleofwhich
a baggage vector reflects the individual valuesof an access path at any
given point in time.
Amechanism which performs the actual checkingtermed the validator.
PATH CONTEXT MODEL RELATED ISSUES
Although itdoes notfall withinthe scope of this chapter to providea discussion
of PCM and its actual operation, there are some issues which relate to the
fundamentals which deserve some attention.
Toachievecomputersecurity objectives a computersecurity system consisting
of three components, a baggage collection vehicle, security profile and
validator togetherwith their functions and specifications can be defined. A
number of questions can be posed which explain how PCM fits together :
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(a) The first question is how the baggage collection vectors are
constructed? Essentially the idea is that the baggage collection vehicle
should be viewed as logical mechanisms in the sense that the process
of collection and storage of baggage vectors can be physically handled
bymorethanone mechanism. The key is that the required info~mation
should be collected and transported so that appropriate checking of
security objectives can take place. The baggage collection vehiclecan
take the form of logging mechanisms, exits, control blocks taskvectors,
etc.,whilethe baggage vectors maymanifest themselves in logs, control
blocks,system status vectors, etc. Baggage deficiency is therefore a
logical concept which may span any number of domains or system
software components.
(b) Thevalidator is invoked once access to a secured object isattempted.
Twoissues arise : How PCM detects a secured object and, secondly,
how the validator is invoked.
It is submitted that the mosteffective identification of secured objects
isthe record of theirdefinition in E. Alternatively such a situation can
be simulated by an add on dictionary type system of resources and
their security status. Components inE should be capable of invoking
the validator when encounteringa secured object.
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(c) PCM contains the definition of an object on the security profile. It
contains compulsory and prohibitive conditions which describe object
access criteria rather than accessor restrictions to which it is linked.
Again the concept involves a logical perspective. The actual
implementation of PCM allows criteria which are uniqu~ to an
environment Eto dictate physical implementation whilst retaining the
logicaldesign and conceptual soundness ata higher levelof abstraction.
(d) The role of identification, authentication and the riskprofile have been
defined. Techniques such as PINSand Passwords all relate to the risk
of impersonation and can therefore be selected in terms of a specific
environment's requirements. The tools and techniques which are
available to enhance identification and authentication simply do that
and nothing more.
(e) Finally, one of the interesting applications of PCM is by using it to
provide a level of abstraction or a global view of security in nearly any
environment in existence today. By means of the baggage 'collection
vehicle, security profile and validator and simulation thereof,
shortcomings in many situations can be identified and resolved. This
area which was a major criteria of the research is referred to as
automated computer security support and the results of the research
form part of a separate chapter.
(.
7.
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CONCLUSION.
In dealing with computer security issues the definitions of certain fundamental
concepts have often confused the real issues. This chapter has concentrated
on one framework which can be used to clarify some of the ambiguity which
surrounds computer security. Starting with basic segregation of duties
principles, the approach has been to formalise computer security
fundamentals and showing how, ultimately, a path context model for
addressing computer security in a wide variety of environments can apply
them.
Although a detailed discussion of the model is not contained in this chapter,
its major contribution lies in the investigation and formalising of the principles
which form the base for automatic security profile generation, automatic
securityevaluation and f1exi-secure computer security mechanisms.
Its application lies mainly in the area of potentially non-secure computer
environments which represents a substantial portion of real-world' computer
environments. The model also permits a level of abstraction and simulation
which can deal efficiently with heterogeneous and distributed computer
environments.
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APPENDIX A
TOWARDS FORMALISING COMPUTER SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS
To introducesomeformalism for a given organisational environment a set of
valid business activities or tasks BT is defined. For these activities to be carried
out the organisation requires a set of people A. BT x A represents all the
possible combinations ofactivities and people. In terms ofthe hierarchywhich
waspresented abovea set approval and/or segregation ofdutiesare required
to ensure that BT are authorised as being valid. This clearly prohibits the
implementation of BT x A as is and necessitates the introduction of a
segregation function f such that BT a =: f (BT x A). BT a reflects the
organisation's policy in terms of the activities which various persons in the
organisation can perform. Note that BT a ~ f (BT x A).
Given a computerised environmentEas described in the notation section BT
would be implemented by means of computer activities CT and manual
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activitiesM. ToreflectB a = (BT X A)twofurthersetsCT aandM aaredefined
suchthatCT a = g(CT X Act)andM A = heM X Am)whereA = ActUAmand
g, h are segregation of duties functions. Whilst BT and Mare intuitively clear,
CT is not readily apparent
The question surrounding CT is its relation to the computer environment E.
An examination of CT suggests that to perform any CT i ,CT i E: CT requires
an access P ifP i E P where P represents all access paths in P. Note that the
definition of P includes a set of primary accessors. An interesting phenomena
(,
arises whereby P represents an unactivated path. An access path is only
activated when AcT i , ACT i E: AcT is associated with it by means of a logon
process which creates the linkage or mapping between the two. An invalid
access is created when a given ACT j , ACT j E: ACT is logged on to an accessor
which has not been assigned to ACT j • CT a can now be redefined as
CT a =g(P'X AcT)whereg represents the segregation of duties function as
described above.
Finally, by examining BT and its relation to CT and M, it is concluded that
BT = CTuM. In the event of BT c CTuM it implies that invalid activities
have been implemented in the organisation whereas BT :::) CT u M implies
not all valid activities are carried out in the organisation.
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PROPOSITION 1.
Computersecurity canbe defined asa technique for implementingsegregation
of duties in a computer environment
Proof.
Given a setBT ofvalid business activities implemented by means of a setCT
of computerised and M of manual activities such that BT =CT u M. To .
implement CTand M it is necessary to introduce a set of personsA, ACT and
A m such that A = ACT U A m and segregation of duties such that
BT a =g (CT X ACT) U h (M X Am). The actual implementation of CT is by
meansof P. Note that P is the implementation ofCTwhich in turn is related
to BT. CTtherefore reflects the organisational requirements whereas P is the
actual implementation. Unless BT a =S(P X ACT )Uh(M X Am) the above
validity hierarchy is potentially violated with S being the security function.
Furthermore, unless there is a unique one-to-one relationship between the
accessor in P, say A II and ACT t such that At = ACT i' then
S (P X ACT) ::F g (CT X ACT). Note that P represents the unactivated paths
whereasS (P X ACT) represent the activated access paths. Concentrati ng on
the computer component only :
(a) Valid activities by means of implicit authorisation is only possible if
S (P x ACT) =g ( CT x ACT ).
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(b) S(PX ACT) c g(CT x ACT) implies that E has not necessarily been
constructed according to thevalidity hierarchy thus compromising the
concept of authorisation.
~
(c) S(P X ACT):> g(CT x ACT) implies that computer activities which
are not of the business are possible.
Conclusion.
Computer security actually deals with ensuring that
S (P x ACT) = 9 ( CT x A c) T with the objective of ensuring that the validity
I .
hierarchy can be satisfied. Unless specific approval procedures override
S(P x ACT ) computersecurity can be regarded as a techniquewhich can be
used ina comp~ter environment toensure implicit authorisation. This implies
that it enforces segregation of duties. Where any invalid activity, including
any form of access by unvetted accessors, say A u are performed the activity
issaid to fall outside the sphere of activities which constitute validity and are
there invalid. All policies, administrative arrangements and approaches are
therefore geared to ensure effective implementation and operation of
computer security.
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The definition of objects therefore need to be done in such a way that it can
be determined whether S(PXAcT)=g(CTXA cT). To illustrate the
concepts which have been presented the following example is presented :
Examples of Validity Hierarchy.
Assume the followinG
('-
BT A BT a
B I Al BIA I
B 2 A 2 f(BTXA)= B 2A I,B 2 A 3
B 3 A 3 B 3A},B 3A 2
B 4 A 4 B 4A 3,B 4A 4
M
B} ~ M} A-} M}A}
B2~M2 A 3 h(MX Am) = M 2A 3
B3~M3 A 4 M 3A I
.
B3~M4 M 4A 2
B4~Ms M sA 3,M sA 4
CT CTa
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B2~CI Al C1A 1
B2~C2 A 2 g(CT x ACT) = C 2A 1,C2A 3
B3~C3 A 3 C 3A 1
B3~C4 C 4A 2
p P-activated
CI~AISIS2FIRI Al Al ~ AISIS2FIRI
C 2 ~ A I SIS 2F I R 2 A 2 S(P X ACT) = Al ~AISIS2FIR2
C2~A3SIS2FIR2 A 3 A3~A3SIS2FIR2
C3~AISIS2FIR3 Al ~ AISIS2FIR3
C4~A2SIS2FIR4 A2~A2SIS2FIR4
The actual implementation of BT a in terms of the manual and computerised
activities are
e:
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Theimplications ofcomputersecurity are that unless P is structured to enforce
the requirements ofBTthere isa risk of invalid activities. For example assume
there existed C4 with A 3 SIS 2 FIR 2' Under these circumstances the
segregation of duties requirements of B 3. B 3. A 1 and B 3 A 2 are not satisfied.
This illustrates the principle thatcomputersecurity isgearedtowards enforcing
division of duties.
PROPOSITION 1.
Identification and authentication of an accessor only serves in verifying its
claim ofbeingwho it is purportedto be. Unless a security profile which detail
these rights is associated with the accessor, E is potentially non-secure.
Assume an access path denoted by AtC 1C 2...C nO J with C/ E E(i = 1, n),
Insofar as anyaccessors existanygiven identification and authentication only
serve to establish the credentials of one accessor. In terms of an access path
definition AIC 1C 2"'CnO .the identification process can onlygive rise to A t0
where ~ = NIL This does not permit any form of subsequent checking thus
showing that an access path A t0-cannot be used to prove anything
conclusively. Additional information C l"'CnO J termed baggaging is
therefore necessary to allow subsequent checking.
•
(,
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Given an access path P = AiC 1 C 2' •• C nO j with identification and
authentication as established previously. To achieve the objective of
establishingS (P x ACT) = 9 (CT x ACT) (as described in the previous proof)
it is necessary that 9 ( CT x ACT) be reflected for an external reference to P
in a form that S (P x ACT) = 9 ( CT x ACT) can be verified. The existence of
9 (CT x ACT) is termed the security profile and obviously insofar as Pcannot
refer to a security profile, a similar situation to A i0 is created. This leaves E
non-secure.
PROPOSITION 3
Encryption is a technique whereby information relating to an access path P
or a security profile 9 (CT x ACT) is transformed to prevent disclosure of the
underlying information which could result in S (P x ACT) = 9 (CT x ACT) (as
in proposition 1) being.compromised. It services no function in establishing
whether S(P x ACT) = g(CTX ACT)'
Given a set of access paths P and a security profi Ie 9 ( CT x ACT)arid that by
applying an encryption or transformation algorithm T to Pand 9 ( CT x ACT)
or any individual components T (P) and T (g ( CT x ACT) isderived. Assume'
that encryption can perform an active function in establishing that
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S(P x ACT) =g(CT x ACT) ~hen T(g(CT x ACT) and g(CT x ACT) do
not necessarily enforce the same division of duties or T (P) and P represent
different access paths.
The basic principle of encryption T and de-encryption T- 1, is that
T-T(g(CTXA cT) and T-T(S(PXAcr))=S(PXAcT)thus implying
that T does not impacton the security profile or the access path.
PROPOSITION 4
Substitute authorisation, proxy logins or any other process whereby accessors
are transformed will always give rise to non-secure conditions unless one of
the following apply:
(a) Given any primary accessor A 1 there isalways a one to one mapping
between A 1 and accessors A j , j > 1 which is generated within an
.
access path P.
(b) In a given acce~s P enough information about P is maintained to
establish when an object is accessed whether
g (CT x AI) = S (P x AI) for a primary accessor A 1. Define this
information as a set of baggaging vectors BV.
4.
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Given an access path set P and a security profile set 9 ( CT x ACT), A CT can
be extended to A' CT with accessors generated by proxy logins, substitute
authorisation or any accessor transformation. The security issue isstillto show
S(PXACT)xg(CTXA cT) which can only be true if
S (P x A' CT ) = 9 (CT x ACT)' This is so if there exists a one to one mapping
such that effectively ACT =A' CT- Insofar as this is not the case, enough
information needs to exist about P in BV in order that it can be established
whether S (P x A' CT ) = 9 ( CT x ACT ).
APPUCATION OF PATH CONTEXT CONCEPTS.
The value of this kind of research lies in it providing a better understanding
of computer security as well in its application to real world issues. Whilst
formal derivation provides evidence of theoretically sound concepts and
propositions, their ability to describe and provide solutions to these 'problems
is the ultimate test The objective of the propositions which have been
described above was to introduce some of the conceptual foundations as well
as a notation and structure which can be used to provide a better
understanding of computer security. This section is presented as an evolution
of classic security theory which was developed in the seventies.
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Having provided someformalism to the basic conceptsinthe previous section,
the logical progression is to derive the specification of the underlying security
model. Again use is made of a propositional format
PROPOSITION 5.
A computer security system is adequate iff it contains the following three
components :
(a) A tracking mechanisms of accessors and access, termed a Baggage
Collection Vehicle in this paper.
(b) A mechanism which describes and contains the restrictions of an
accessor orobjectand the rules whichareassociated with the accessing
of objects. This has been termed the Security Profile.
(c) A mechanism, termed the Validator, which applies the rules and
restrictions which are contained in the security profile to aspecific
baggage vectorwhich is constructed bythe baggage collection vehicle
duringa particular access or service request
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Proof.
In proposition 1 it was shown that unless g(CT x ACT) = s(P X ACT) there
is a risk of invalid activities. This, however, addresses the macro or universal
level thus creating the necessity for defining CT i E CT 1 ACT j E A cT,1P k E P
where t , j , k > o. The requirement for an individual accessor A cr j' is
ACTj CT j == ACT j P j where j implies a relationship such that ultimately
g ( CT x ACT) = S (P x ACT) is satisfied. To ensure ACTi CT j = ACT j P j it is
necessary for ACTiCT i to be defined (the security profile), P j (the baggage
(-
vector) and a mechanism for comparing the two (the validator).
PROPOSITION 6.
Security exposures can be defined as the degree of certaintywhich the three
components of a securitysystem provides that g ( CT x ACT) = S (P x ACT}
Proof.
In proposition 5 it was shown that for a single service request it is necessary
that ACTiCT i = AP i with AcrCT'i being the security profile and P J the
baggage vector and the comparison being made by the validator. In section
2 the definition of an environment E which is used to formulate access paths
comprises E = {D x S x I x 0 x A} with D ={Valid dornains}xk; S ={Valid
Software Cornponents}xk; I ={Integrated States}xk; 0 ={Valid Objects]x k;
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A =={Valid Accessorsjxj-and K ={Valid Access Classes}. In its simplest form
AiD J = P J with all the risks associated with D. S and I and 0 capable of
circumventing it. The form with CT' == f (D. S • I •0) represents a finer
degree of control over P. Insofar as an accessor isrestricted interms ofD •S • I
and 0 a less risky situation is produced as an accessor is highly restricted in
terms of capabilities within p. By defining CT and P well formed if they
contain restrictions in terms of D , S , I and 0 such that CT = f (D •S • I .0)
and P = g(D, S, I , 0) then security exposures are high to the extent that
S ( CT ' x ACT) = P withCTand P are not well formed. Insofar asCT' x ACT
and P, with bothCT and P well formed, those components of D , S , I and 0
withinCT and P which cannot be compared by the validator are redundant.
Asituation iscreated as ifCTand P are not well formed thus resulting in high
security exposures.
PROPOSITION 7.
Asecurityexposure exists where an accessor A i istransformed into or proxied
byanother accessorA i, i :1= j and the baggagevector bears no evidence of this
fact when the validator is invoked to verify that S (A CT x CT' i) = P J.
Proof.
Where accessor transformation or proxy access takes place a consolidated
baggage vector hasa format [Ai .• . • A i .•.. OJ. Under these circumstancesthe
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validator is capable to performing a comparison with the security profile and
conclude A i has accessed 0 r Assume split baggage vectors [A i......] and
[A r....D J. When the validator performs the above function there is
inconclusive evidence unless At=A j or a one to one mapping between Ai
and A j exists. It cannot therefore be shown that CT ' x ACT = P and hence a
.
security exposure exists. It is, however, obvious that a split baggage vector
[A i".A j] and (A r.D j] does not fall under the above restriction provided both
are available to the validator for reference when required.
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1. INTRODUCTION.
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the research project and
the resulting dissertation in terms of scientific contribution. Whilst the
results and their acceptance for international publication may be
deemed noteworthy, itis feltthatthe scientific process and contribution
to the development of a paradigm for computer security are equally
important. Consequently the scope of this evaluation is wider than
the original scope as set out in the introduction.
2. DIRECT CONTRIBUTION TO THE
FIELD OF COMPUTER SECURITY.
The most significant achievement of this research lies in the Path
Context Model (PCM) which originated. Although fairly simple, the
structure and definition permits the implementation, evaluation and
monitoring of computer security in environments which are potentially
. non-secure because of the manner in which technology is applied.
Experimentswith the Path Context Model shows its applicability in a
wide variety of environments, particularly complex ones. Typically
theseconsistof multi-domain, distributed and heterogeneous network
environments such aswide area networks and local area networks.
A second areaof achievement is the success with which organisational
administrative principles and computer security prin~iples could be
3.
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formally integrated to provide a number of fundamental laws which
govern computersecurity. Theselaws essentially comprise the Validity
Hierarchy or segregation of duties; identification, authentication and
security profile relationships; accessor transformation and/orsubstitute
authorisation, the essential componentsofa computersecurity system
and risk of security exposures.
Theabove havecontributedto a comprehensive or hollistic definition
ofcomputersecuritywhich hasdirectapplication inmany organisations
which utilise computer technology.
APPLICATION OF CLASSIC COMPUTER SCIENCE THEORY.
Any development in an area such as computer security needs to be
based on formal theoretical principles. Absence to achieve this gives
rise to the risk of propagating fragmented adhocracy. Whilstthe theory
which is utilised for such a purpose is not necessarily restricted, it was
deemed moreappropriate to attempt application of classic computer
science theory. In this arena a new application of Random Context
Grammarswasfound. Itwasestablished that the opportunities of these
Grammars afforded unique properties in describing elaborate
protection or restriction capabilities ofsecuredobjects. Two grammars,
a Path Contextff'C) Grammarandan Extended PCGrammaroriginated
4.
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from specifying the Path Context Model. Both rely on the properties
of Random Context Grammars to create an alternative model for
computer security.
REPRESENTING COMPUTER SECURITY.
One of the characteristics of mature research is the ability to accept
the possibility that improvements, enhances or major leaps over any
initial research can be made. The real contribution any individual
researcher may make to any area should therefore not be restricted to
the achievement of direct results but extended to include the
understanding of the field or area being researched.
Our view of the above in relation to the field of computer security is
that there are currently shortcomings in the following areas
(a) Conceptual framework
(b) Reference disciplines
(c) Representation issues.
The project on which this dissertation is based has attempted to
communicate the development of thinking which address the above.
Specifically the Path Context Model which consists of the Baggage
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Collection Vehicle, Security Profile and validator and interfaces with
the Validity Hierarchy establishes a theoretically sound conceptual
framework for addressing computer security. On such a basis it is
possible to further evolve an understanding of what is becoming a very
complex organisational issue.
Computer security isunique in the sense that itis a field which combines
organisational administrative principles, technology and computer
science. These serve as the reference disciplines which need to be
considered when proposing alternative theories. In this context we
have used set theory, access path principles, Random Context
Grammars and have interfaced them to provide the contents of this
dissertation. Of interest then isthe contribution of this project of linking
multiple disciplines to solve a multi-dimensional problem; in this case
computer security.
Having established a conceptual framework and reference-disciplines
does not necessarily guarantee success. It is only when they are
combined and represented in such a way that its actual functioning
.can be modelled and experimented with, that progress is made. The
ultimate in representation is the ability to apply artificial intelligence
or expert system principles to the problem as this requires a
comprehensive understanding of the subject's representation. In this
dissertation the proposals for automated computer security support
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provide evidence of successful representation. Specifically the
concepts of baggaging, an access path and a Validity Hierarchy permit
representation of the conceptual framework within the scope of the
reference disciplines.
Byway of concluding remarks it is submitted that each of the various
papers which constitute this dissertation contain the evolution of this
representation concept from an overview to the detailed treatment of
the individual areas and provides an unique contribution towards not
only an understanding the field of computer security but also
representation of multi-discipline problem areas.
5~ INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE.
The unique contribution of this research is evidenced by the
justification to publish the complete dissertation as four independent
articles in international publications.
6. CONCLUSION.
From the account provided above of the research and therefore of the
dissertation, it is submitted that a significant contribution has been
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.made, not only to the field of computer security, but also to the areas
of applying classic computer science theory, problem representation
and the scientific process in multi-reference discipline problem
domains.
CHAPTER 7
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Contents
1. References,
Page 126.
REFERENCES.
1. D.E. Bell and L]. LaPadula, "Secure Computer System : Unified
Exposition and Multics Interpretation', Report ESD-TR-75-306,
MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA (March 1976).
2. W.H. Boshoff, "The Interface between Application and Integrity
Controls in Modern Computer Systems", Dissertation in fulfilment of.
a Masters Degree in Economic Sciences, Rand Afrikaans University,
May 1985.
3. D.E. Denning, ·A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow",
Communications ofthe ACM 19, No.5, 243-250 (May 1970).
4. P.A. Karger, "Authentlcation and Discretionary Access Control in
Computer Networks, Computers & Security 5,314-324 (1986).
5. B.W.Lampson, 'Protection', Proceedings of the 5th Annual Princeton
Conferenceon Information Scienceand Systems (1971), pp 437-443,
.Reprinted inACMOperatingSystems Review8, No.1, 18-24 (January
1970).
Page 127.
6. C.E. Landwehr, "The Best Technologies for Computer Security,
Computer 16, NO.7, 86-99 (luly 1983).
7. R.C. Summers, "An Overview of Computer Security, IBM Systems
Journal 23, No. 4, 309-325 (1984).
8. Van der Walt, "Random Context Languages Symposium on Formal
Languages", Oberwolfach. W-Germany, (1970). Abstracted in
I'Mitteilingen der Gesellschaft f~r Mathematik und..
Datenverarbeitung", Bonn.
9. S.H. von Solms, "RandomContext Array Grammars", Proceedings of
IFIP180, Tokyo, Japan.
10. S.H.von Solms, "Node-label controlled graphgrammars with Context
Conditions", International Journal of Computer Mathematics, 1984,
Vol. 15.
11. S.D. Halper, G.c. Davis, P.J. O'Neil-Dunne, P.R. Pfau, "Handbook
of EDP Auditing and Supplements", Warren, Gorham & Lamont
(1986).
12. J.D. Moffett and M.S. Sloman, "The Source of Authority for
Commercial Access Control", Computer Vol. .21, No.2, 59-69
(February1988).
